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Resumo	China	e	Irã	possuem	o	antigo	portão	da	Rota	Marítima	da	Seda,	além	de	duas	novas	 vias	nessa	mesma	 rota,	 a	 saber,	 o	Estreito	de	Ormuz	 e	 o	Estreito	de	Malaca.	Ao	contrário	do	Estreito	de	Ormuz,	a	segurança	marítima	no	Estreito	de	Malaca	precisa	 ser	 redesenhada	e	 restabelecida	pelos	Estados	do	 litoral	para	 o	 corredor	 de	 segurança.	 O	 objetivo	 deste	 estudo	 é	 descobrir	 o	 novo	conceito	 e	 classificação	 de	 segurança	marítima,	 notadamente	 os	 elementos	de	insegurança	direta	e	indireta.	Este	estudo	ilustra	que	os	elementos	diretos	e	 indiretos	 mais	 notáveis	 são,	 respectivamente,	 pirataria,	 assalto	 à	 mão	armada	 e	 presença	 de	 um	 Estado	 externo.	 Reconhece-se	 que	 a	 presença	contínua	 e	 perigosa	 de	 um	 Estado	 externo	 é	 um	 elemento	 indireto	 de	insegurança.	 À	 luz	 das	 atividades	 de	 violação	 e	 desestabilização	 por	 parte	dos	 EUA	 no	 Golfo	 Pérsico	 e	 no	 Mar	 da	 China	 Meridional,	 sua	 presença	 e	passagem	são	consideradas	atividades	não-inocentes,	pois	são	prejudiciais	à	boa	 ordem,	 paz	 e	 segurança	 dos	 Estados	 localizados	 ao	 longo	 da	 costa.	Portanto,	uma	nova	proposta	chamada	Doutrina	do	“No	Sheriff"	é	oferecida	neste	 artigo	 para	 possivelmente	 impedir	 a	 formação	 de	 hegemonias	 em	todas	as	regiões	no	futuro.	
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Abstract	China	and	Iran	have	the	ancient	gate	of	Maritime	Silk	Road,	as	well	as	two	 new	 superhighways	 within	 this	 road,	 namely	 Strait	 of	 Hormuz	and	Malacca	Strait.	Unlike	the	Strait	of	Hormuz,	maritime	security	in	the	 Malacca	 Strait	 needs	 to	 be	 redesigned	 and	 re-established	 by	littoral	states	for	the	safe	corridor.	The	aim	of	this	study	is	to	find	out	the	new	concept	and	classification	of	maritime	security,	namely	direct	and	indirect	 insecurity	elements.	This	study	illustrates	that	the	most	remarkable	 direct	 and	 indirect	 elements	 are	 respectively	 piracy,	armed	robbery,	and	external	state	presence.	 It	 is	acknowledged	 that	the	 continuous	 and	 dangerous	 presence	 of	 an	 external	 state	 is	 the	indirect	 insecurity	 element.	 In	 the	 light	 of	 the	 USA's	 violation	 and destabilizing	activities	in	the	Persian Gulf	and	the	South	China	Sea,	its	presence	 and	 passage	 are	 considered as	 noninnocent	 activities,	 as	these	 are	prejudicial	 to	 the	 good	 order,	 peace	 and	 security	 of	 states	located	along	the	coast.	Therefore,	a	new	doctrine	called	the	"Doctrine	of	No	Sheriff"	is	offered	in	this	article	to	possibly	prevent	the	uprising	of	hegemonies	in	every	region	in	the	future.	
Keywords:	Maritime	Security,	the	Persian	Gulf,	Doctrine	of	No	Sheriff,	Continued	Presence		 	
Introduction		 Since	 ancient	 times,	 the	 seas	 have	 been	 a	 principal	 platform	 for	 trade	 and	communications.	 In	 today’s	 hectic	 world,	 maritime	 security	 is	 one	 of	 the	 most	 important	pillars	of	international	order	and	one	of	the	indispensable	elements	of	economic	development.	Piracy	occurs	 in	different	areas	around	the	world,	966	Piracy	and	Armed	Robbery	 incidents	occurred	in	the	South	China	Sea	(SCS),	331	Piracy	and	Armed	Robbery	acts	happened	in	the	Malacca	Strait	between	2007	and	2017	(IMO,	2019).	While	only	14	Piracy	and	Armed	Robbery	acts	were	noticed	 for	 the	duration	of	 	 the	 last	 ten	years	 in	 the	Persian	Gulf	and	the	Strait	of	Hormuz	 (IMO,	 2019),	 so	 they	 were	 entirely	 safe	 as	 Iranian	 naval	 forces	 controlled	 and	protected	the	Persian	Gulf	and	the	vital	Strait	of	Hormuz.	Hence,	all	ships,	vessels	were	able	to	traffic	under	full	security.	Such	security	in	the	region	of	the	Persian	Gulf	is	able	to	guarantee	that	China's	energy	independence	and	economic	security	would	be	sustained,	thus	enhancing	the	economic	development	and	its	national	political	stability	(Chung,	2017).	The	biggest	issue	facing	 the	world	 today	 is	navigation	 security	 as	 it	 is	 raising	 increasing	 concern	 in	Asia.	The	South	China	Sea	and	the	Malacca	Strait	and	the	Persian	Gulf2	and	the	Strait	of	Hormuz,	which	
																																								 																				2 The	historic	term	of	"Persian	Gulf"	dates	to	the	period	of	Ptolemy.	C.	Edmund	Bosworth,	The	Nomenclature	of	the	Persian	Gulf	in	The	 Persian	 Gulf	 States:	 A	 General	 Survey	 xvii-xxxvi	 (Alvin	 J.	 Cottrell	 ed.,	 1980),	 reprinted	 in	 C.	 Edmund	 Bosworth,	 The	Nomenclature	of	 the	Persian	Gulf	30	 Iranian	Studies	77,	88-89	(1997).	The	 fake	phrase	of	 "Arabian	Gulf"	 is	only	stated	by	 the	United	Arab	Emirates.	At	the	34th	Plenary	Meeting	of	the	Second	Session	of	the	UNCLOS	III	in	1974,	the	Iranian	representative	in	response	to	the	representative	of	the	United	Arab	Emirates,	that	referred	to	the	“body	of	water”	as	the	"Arabian	Gulf"	named	the	
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serve	as	the	major	 international	navigation	routes,	are	known	as	Maritime	Silk	Road.	 In	this	regard,	 firstly	 the	 Chinese	 leadership	 described	 the	 strategic	 ideas.	 President	 Xi	 Jinping	introduced	 "The	 One	 Belt	 One	 Road	 Initiative"	 when	 he	 visited	 Kazakhstan	 in	 September,	2013.	He	recommended	that	China	and	Central	Asia	collaborate	to	make	a	Silk	Road	Economic	Belt.	The	Maritime	Silk	Road	of	the	21st	Century	(Hereinafter	MSR)	is	as	well	the	part	of	the	Belt	and	Road	Initiative.	(Xinhua,	2015)	MSR	is	not	just		a	"Road"	but	it	is	a	strategic	model	to	control	 strategic	 sea	 lines,	 developing	 all-round	 economy,	 and	 establishment	 of	 Chinese	hegemony	version.	The	oldest	maritime	road	begins	from	the	South	China	Sea	and	the	Strait	of	Malacca	and	Singapore,	the	Indian	ocean	then	passes	through	the	Strait	of	Hormuz	and	ends	up	to	the	Persian	Gulf.	Albuquerque	believed	that	"a	state	will	dominate	the	world	trade	which	is	the	same	state	able	to	control	three	bypasses	namely	the	Hormuz	Strait,	the	Malacca	Strait	and	the	Bab	al	Mandab".3	According	to	Teo	(2007),	“Whoever	controls	the	Straits	of	Malacca	and	the	Indian	Ocean	could	threaten	China’s	oil	supply	route”.	According	to	Storey	(2008),	70-80	%	of	China	and	90%	of	energy	import	of	Japan	pass	through	the	Straits	every	year.	Piracy	and	armed	robbery	are	 the	biggest	risks	 for	peace	and	security	 in	sea	 lanes	(Kevin	X.	Li;	 Jin	Cheng,	2006).	As	from	the	perspective	of	the	international	law,	piracy	and	its	participants	are	considered	as	hostis	humani	generis	or	“enemies	of	all	humankind”	(Percy,	2016).	Only	sixty	world	straits	can	be	considered	main	world	trade	sea	lines	of	communication	(Kraska,	2014).	In	the	20th	and	the	21st	centuries,	several	conventions	have	been	held	and	resolutions	have	been	admitted	to	increase	security	and	the	suppression	of	piracy	and	armed	robbery.	Despite	proper	law,	regulations,	strict	measures	against	dire	events	have	not	been	taken,	some	states	are	abused	for	power	balance	in	case	of	insecurity	in	a	given	region	and	they	are	satisfied	with	that.	 The	 international	 law	 has	 all	 states	 universally	 called	 to	 combat	 and	 suppression	 of	piracy.	The	terms	"piracy"	and	“armed	robbery”	have	been	clarified	by	the	1982	Convention	on	 Law	 of	 the	 Sea	 1982	United	Nations	 Convention	 on	 the	 Law	 of	 the	 Sea,	 United	Nations.	(hereinafter	 UNCLOS)	 and	 the	 International	 Maritime	 Organization	 (hereinafter	 IMO)	respectively.	 Despite	 the	 wide	 using	 the	 term	 "maritime	 security"	 by	 the	 international	community,	there	is	no	legal	definition	for	this	term	under	the	international	law.	IMO	has	not	defined	 "maritime	 security"	 yet	 (Klein,	 2011).	 Maximo	 Q.	 Mejia	 Jr	 believes	 that	 the	 terms	“security”	and	“safety”	are	synonymous	in	most	situations,	but	in	the	shipping	issue	we	should	distinguish	between	both	terms.	(Mejia,	2003)	Basically,	security	is	of	key	importance	in	state	decision-making	and	theory-building.	Andrew	Mack	(1993)	has	stated:	“The	security	dilemma	arises	 when	 nation	 states	 seek	 to	 maximize	 their	 security	 via	 policies	 of	 “peace	 through	strength”—	 that	 is,	 by	 creating	 a	military	 capability	 that	will	 enable	 them	 to	defeat	 .	 .	 .	 any	opponent	bent	on	opposition.”		Insomuch	 as	 international	 economy	 and	 relations	 will	 be	 certainly	 influenced	 by	 the	future	of	MSR	on	one	hand	and	the	new	international	order	and	navigational	security	on	the	other	 hand,	 the	 new	 "Doctrine	 of	No	 Sheriff"	 should	 be	 theorized	 under	 common	 interests.	Accordingly,	 it	 will	 significantly	 increase	 the	 MSR	 security	 through	 a	 new	 mechanism.	 In	future	 years	 the	major	 part	 of	 the	world	will	 observe	 important	 changes	 in	 the	 rise	 of	 the	navigation	security	of	States	bordering	the	straits	of	Hormuz	and	Malacca	and	Singapore,	as	well	as	other	countries	from	these	straits,	following	this	doctrine.	It	is	essential	to	improve	the	security	 of	 MSR	 due	 to	 the	 strategic	 and	 geopolitical	 situation	 of	 all	 three	 straits.	 For	 this	purpose,	 the	 "Doctrine	 of	 No	 Sheriff"	 should	 be	 recognized	 in	 line	with	 improving	 regional	
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																								term	"Arabian	Gulf,"	"improper"	and	a	"fabricated	label,"	of	"recent	vintage,"	and	a	"distortion	of	 fact."	UNCLOS	III,	1973	1982,	
34th	Mtg.,	at	140-42,	U.N.	Doc.A/CONF.62/SR.34	(July	9,	1974).	3	 Alphonso	 Albuquerque	 D'	 was	 born	 in	 1453	 'at	 Alexandria,	 near	 Lisbon,	 (1453-1515),	 surnamed	 THE	 GREAT,	 and	 THE	PORTUGUESE	MARS.	 
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security	and	the	establishment	of	sustainable	security.	Hence	this	article	aims	to	coin	the	term	the	"Doctrine	of	No	Sheriff"	to	respond	to	Unipolarity,	impact,	and	influence	of	the	continued	presence	of	maritime	powers	for	decreasing	insecurity	in	the	MSR.	Forasmuch	as	the	Malacca	Strait	and	 the	Strait	of	Hormuz	have	strategic	 importance,	 the	USA	have	always	 intended	 to	dominate	these	straits.	Since	they	want	to	show	their	reasonable	presence,	they	welcome	any	conflict	 or	 insecurity	 in	 SCS	 and	 the	 Malacca	 Strait.	 Moreover,	 the	 USA,	 by	 performing	Freedom	 of	 Navigation	 Operations	 (FONOPs),	 and	 Japan,	 by	 sending	Maritime	 Self-Defense	Force	 (MSDF)	 vessels	 in	 Support	 of	 FONOPs,	 have	made	 choices	 that	 exacerbated	 regional	tensions	in	SCS	(Grønning,	2017).	The	USA	are	also	seeking	to	create	tensions	in	the	Persian	Gulf	to	control	the	Strait	of	Hormuz	even	though	tacitly.	The	main	purpose	of	the	article	is	to	give	the	comprehensive	analysis	of	the	concept	of	maritime	security	and	to	propound	a	new	classification	on	maritime	security	and	to	seek	the	ways	to	 improve	maritime	security.	As	 it	will	be	seen,	the	U.S.	Navy	and	the	Britain’s	Naval	violations	in	recent	decades	in	the	Persian	Gulf,	on	one	hand,	and	the	violation	of	international	law	in	disputed	islands	(Zohourian,	2018)	by	 the	U.S.	 in	 SCS	 (Aljazeera,	 2017),	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 provokes	 littoral	 states	 to	 increase	conflicts	among	them.	Moreover,	no	state	endures	the	actions	of	any	of	the	states	committed	under	the	pretext	of	freedom	of	navigation	and	 flights	 that	may	damage	sovereignty	and	the	interests	 of	its	 national	 security.	 It	 would	 be	 easy	 to	 construe	 that	 the	 element	 of	 the	hazardous	 and	 continued	 presence	 in	 the	 given	 area	 should	 be	 recognized	 as	 the	 indirect	element	related	to	maritime	insecurity.	Since	these	elements	jeopardize	the	status	of	maritime	security,	 they	 should	 be	 considered	 top-priority	 issues	 and	 they	 should	 be	 paid	 more	attention	to.	Therefore,	this	study	consists	of	four	major	parts,	part	I	gives	the	brief	history	of	MSR,	part	II	with	the	emphasis	on	piracy	describes	the	concept	of	maritime	security	and	the	new	 classification,	 concerning	 effective	 elements	 on	 maritime	 insecurity,	 part	 III	 pays	attention	to	the	possible	options	to	combat	piracy	at	the	sea.	Finally,	 the	article	pays	special	attention	to	the	impact	of	indirect	elements	of	the	Maritime	Security	and	the	"Doctrine	of	No	Sheriff".			
A	Brief	History	of	the	Silk	Road		 Iran	and	China	can	be	considered	the	gateway	to	the	ancient	naval	civilization	of	MSR.	The	name	 "Silk	Road''	was	 created	by	 the	German	geographer,	 Ferdinand	von	Richthofen	 in	 the	nineteenth century	 (Steinmann,	 2012).	 The	 history	 of	 trade	 in	 Chinese	 silk	 textiles	 mostly	dates	 to	 the	Han	dynasty,	 circa	206	B.C.	 to	A.D.	 220,	 but	 some	 scholars	 believe	 there	 is	 the	evidence	 it	 could	 began	 even	 earlier.	 Merchants	 from	 Iran	 were	 active	 in	 the	 buying	 and	selling	Chinese	silk	in	the	Parthian	era.	Earlier	sending	a	Chinese	mission	to	the	great	empire	of	 Persia	 led	 to	 opening	 a	 new	 chapter	 of	 relations	 for	 the	 aim	 of	 developing	 trade	connections.	The	Silk	Road	through	land	started	in	Tien-Tsin,	the	Chinese	'silk	city'	(now	Tun-Huang),	 going	 through	 Samarkand,	 reached	Merv,	 Nishapur,	 Qazvin,	 and	 Tauris	 (Tabriz)	 in	Iran,	and	 thus	 leading	south	 to	Babylon	(Baghdad)	or	northwest	 to	Trebizond	(Trabzon)	on	the	Black	Sea	(Steinmann,	2012).	Since	 the	Sasanian	period,	Persian	merchants	and	official	delegations	visited	China.	The	main	 ports	 in	 the	 Persian	 Gulf	 were	 Siraf	 and	 Old	 Hormuz.	 In	 the	 Sasanian	 period,	 Siraf	appears	to	have	been	a	military	outpost,	Daryaee	(2003)	states	“it	functioned	as	a	place	where	the	 sea	 traffic	 was	 controlled	 and	 was	 used	 as	 a	 spot	 for	 securing	 the	 Persian	 Gulf”.	 The	Maritime	 Silk	 Road	 began	 from	 the	 southwest	 coastal	 areas	 of	 China,	 particularly	 from	 the	ports	of	Jiaozhou	(present	day	areas	of	Vietnam)	and	Guangzhou,	which	then	extended	around	
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the	coast	of	Indochina,	through	the	Strait	of	Malacca,	entering	the	seacoast	of	the	Indian	Ocean	and	the	Persian	Gulf	area	(Li,	2006).	During	the	Song	Dynasty,	the	administration	of	maritime	trade	was	established,	which	handle	all	routes	of	trade	perfectly.	One	of	this	administration	is	situated	in	Quanzhou,	90	km	away	from	Xiamen.4	According	to	Mr.	Toyohachi	Fujita	of	Japan,	the	 safekeeping	 and	 armed	 escort	 of	 goods	 was	 one	 of	 the	 duties	 of	 the	 department	 of	maritime	 trade	(Li,	2006).	Maritime	Silk	Road	 Initiative	 (MSRI)	and	 the	Silk	Road	Economic	Belt	 (SREB)	were	suggested	by	China	 individually	 in	2013	(Blanchard	&	Flint,	2017).	A	new	episode	of	policy	framework	of	the	"silk	road"	has	been	commenced	by	referring	to	President	Xi	 Jinping's	 suggestion	 to	 create	 the	 ‘Silk	 Road	 economic	 belt’	 in	 Kazakhstan	 in	 September,	2013	during	the	summit	of	the	Shanghai	Cooperation	Organization.	Subsequently,	in	October	of	 the	 same	 year,	 at	 the	 Asia	 Pacific	 Economic	 Cooperation	 (APEC),	 Li	 Keqiang,	 Chinese	Premier,	 stressed	 on	 the	necessity	 to	 create	 the	Maritime	 Silk	Road.	Moreover,	 at	 the	 high-level	Party-state	work	forum	President	Xi	expressed	that	“China	should	cooperate	with	own	neighbors	 to	 speed	 connectivity	 and	 set	 up	 a	 ‘Silk	 Road	 Economic	 Belt’	 and	 ‘Maritime	 Silk	Road’	 for	 the	 21st	 century”.	 It	 seems	 such	meeting	 with	 emphasizing	 on	 ‘neighborhood’	 or	‘periphery’	 diplomacy	 became	 the	 first	 high-level	 meeting	 during	 the	 history	 of	 China	(Summers,	 2016).	 Hence,	 considering	 geopolitics	 and	 geographic	 important	 of	 the	 Malacca	and	 Hormuz	 Straits,	 these	 Straits	 have	 an	 eminent	 strategic	 and	 economic	 importance.	Another	important	point	to	know	is	that	Iran	is	the	only	country	in	which	maritime	and	land	silk	roads	connect	 through	the	Persian	Gulf.	Without	raising	the	security	 in	those	straits	 the	sea	lanes	would	lose	its	efficiency.	Any	foreign	states	interference	and	insecurity	for	passing	ships	would	have	catastrophic	incidents	and	detrimental	consequences	for	international	trade	and	security.		
The	Concept	of	the	Maritime	Security	and	New	Classification		
(a)	Treats	and	Risks		In	the	international	domain,	the	threat	to	security	is	posed	by	both	nations	and	non-state	actors.	 (Chatterjee,	 2014)	 In	 brief,	 threats	 are	 comprised	 of	 a	 series	 of	 human	 crimes	 and	environmental	challenges	and	arise	from	state	and	non-state	sources.	In	general,	any	human	criminal	action	or	natural	factors	which	endanger	human	life	or	environment	inland	or	at	the	sea	 would	 be	 a	 threat.	 It	 should	 be	 noted	 the	 type	 of	 threats	 and	 risks	 may	 be	 different	depending	on	the	region.	 	If	any	potential	threat	turns	into	a	real	one,	it	can	be	called	a	risk.	Once	 a	 threat	 turns	 into	 the	 risk	 that	 heavily	 increases	 in	 number,	 and	 is	 also	 repeated	 at	different	times	or	endanger	territorial	integrity	for	example,	by	dispatching	unmanned	Aerial	Vehicles	(violation	of	Iranian	airspace	by	US	RQ-170	and	Scan	Eagle	drones	in	2011	and	2012)	or	cyber-attacks	(the	case	of	cyber-attack	to	the	Natanz	nuclear	facility	of	Iran	by	the	U.S.	and	Israel)5.	Piracy	in	the	Malacca	Strait	or	armed	robbery	in	Somali	waters	has	been	turned	from	threat	phase	into	risk	phase.		Also,	biological	weapons	could	be	considered	another	type	of	indirect	insecurity	element.	The	 USA	 has	 black	 history	 about	 using	 biological	 weapons	 in	 the	 world.6	 According	 to	 the	
																																								 																				4 Also	there	were	administration	of	maritime	trade	 in	Guangzhou,	Hangzhou,	Wenzhou,	Xiuzhou,	Mizhou	and	other	port	cities.	The	most	important	provinces	were	Guangzhou,	Fujian	and	Zhejiang.	5 It	was	 the	world's	 first	cyber	weapon,	code-named	"Olympic	Games"	and	 later	named	"Stuxnet".	This	aggression	 for	 the	 first	time	was	empowered	by	President	Bush	and	after	that	re-authorized	by	Obama.	6 It	 is	 noteworthy	 that	 the	 USA	 began	 in	 1942,	 carrying	 out	 many	 biological	 experiments	 to	 manufacture	 deadly	 chemical	weapons.	
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accurate	data	obtained	from	the	US	Department	of	Defense,	the	American	army	is	working	to	produce	viruses,	bacteria	and	deadly	toxin,	therefore	this	matter	is	a	flagrant	violation	of	the	United	 Nation	 Conventions	 and	 agreement	 on	 the	 non-proliferation	 of	 biological	 weapons.	(Alwaght,	2018)	However,	one	thing	is	clear	and	certain	and	that	is	that	such	actions	by	any	country	will	become	more	important	with	the	elapse	of	time	as	a	result	of	the	appearance	of	security,	 healthiness,	 and	 human	 rights	 consequences,	 which	 are	 not	 new,	 but	 increasingly	growing	 stronger.	 The	 US	 Department	 of	 Defense	 "the	 Pentagon"	 has	 conducted	 many	experiments	on	the	insects	which	are	used	to	transmit	killer	diseases	and	epidemic	in	Georgia	and	regions	of	Russia.7	The	newest	biological	 case	 is	 the	genetic	engineering	of	 coronavirus	known	as	COVID-19.	This	virus	has	 initially	spread	out	 in	China	afterward	 it	 is	spreading	 in	some	 countries	 in	 2020.	 There	 is	 no	 evidence	 about	 the	 conspiracy	 theory	 or	 the	 creator's	origin	 of	 this	 virus	 yet.	 (Stevenson,	 2020)	 However,	 Daily	 Mail	 (Rahhal,	 2020)	 and	 the	Washington	 Times	 (Gertz,	 2020)	 suggested	 coronavirus	 is	 a	 part	 of	 China's	 bio	 warfare	program.	Al-Mayadeen	 (2018)	 and	Alwaght	 (2018)	pointed	out	 the	virus	has	produced	and	transmitted	 to	 the	 Middle	 East	 by	 the	 USA.	 However,	 Senator	 Tom	 Cotton	 raised	 the	possibility	that	the	virus	had	originated	in	a	biochemical	lab	in	Wuhan	of	China	where	is	the	center	of	 the	outbreak.	On	the	other	side,	Russian	Politician,	Vladimir	Zhirinovsky,	 leader	of	the	Liberal	Democratic	Party	of	Russia	claimed	the	coronavirus	 is	an	American	Provocation.	Likewise,	on	March	14,	2020	Zhao	Lijian,	a	spokesman	for	China's	Ministry	of	Foreign	Affairs	wrote	 on	 his	 Twitter	 account	 that	 the	 U.S.	 army	might	 have	 brought	 COVID-19	 to	Wuhan.	(Westcott	 &	 Jiang,	 2020)	 In	 addition	 to	 this,	 it	 should	 be	 noticed	 that	 the	 Defense	 Threat	Reduction	 Agency	 (DTRA)	 award	 funding	 to	 US	 vital	 laboratories	worth	 $	 2.1	 Billion	 titled	collaborative	 Biological	 Participation	 Program	 under	 a	military	 program	 in	 some	 countries	such	 as	 Georgia	 and	 Ukraine,	 as	 well	 as	 the	 Middle	 East,	 Southeast	 Asia	 and	 Africa.	 (Al-Mayadeen,	2018)		Overall,	 the	 type	 and	 extent	 of	 a	 threat	 or	 risk	 is	 directly	 related	 to	 a	 certain	 referent	object,	 for	 instance,	 both	 threats	 and	 risks	 can	 target	 international	 trade,	 human	 life	 or	 the	economy	of	a	country,	or	even	paralyze	it.	Bueger	(2015)	states	that	maritime	security	threats	are	 transnational	 and	maritime	 insecurity	 has	 transnational	 consequences.	 In	 brief,	we	 can	argue	maritime	 security	 issue	 is	 seeking	 to	 protect	 three	major	 components,	 firstly,	 coastal	states	 security,	 secondly,	 sea	 lanes	 security	 (trade	 and	 human),	 and	 thirdly,	 marine	environment.	 As	 it	 will	 be	 explained	 in	 the	 following	 sections	 insecurity	 at	 the	 seas	 is	grounded	 on	 series	 of	 threats	 and	 risks.	 In	 this	 context,	 as	 mentioned	 above,	 those	 acts,	omissions	or	occurrences	whether	legally	or	illegally	committed	by	state	actors	or	non-state	actors	would	be	 considered	 threat	 or	 risk	 if	 lead	 to	 endanger	 at	 least	 one	of	 these	 subjects	such	 as:	 the	 security	 and	 sovereignty	 of	 coastal	 State,	 political	 independence,	 territorial	integrity,	economic	system	of	a	nation	and	even	marine	environment	and	human	life.	Threats	and	risks	can	also	include	natural	phenomena	affecting	the	status	of	navigation.		
(b)	The	Maritime	Security	Framework		The	 term	 "maritime	 security"	 is	 extensively	 used	 by	 the	 scholars	 and	 the	 international	community.	 Nevertheless,	 there	 is	 not	 any	 legal	 definitions	 of	 "maritime	 security"	 under	international	 law	 (Attard,	 2014).	 Hawkes	 (1989)	 provides	 a	 broad	 definition	 of	 maritime	security,	he	explains	maritime	security	as:	 “those	measures	employed	by	owners,	operators,	
																																								 																				7 In	2014,	since	beginning	of	the	American	"Pentagon"	project	in	2014,	a	type	of	flies	has	also	been	seen	in	the	Russian	Republic	of	"Dagestan"	and	the	Republic	of	Georgia.	
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and	 administrators	 of	 vessels,	 port	 facilities,	 offshore	 installations,	 and	 other	 marine	organizations	or	establishments	to	protect	against	threats,	seizure,	sabotage,	piracy,	pilferage,	annoyance	or	surprise”.	Klein	believes	that	distinction	between	two	terms	"maritime	safety"	and	 "maritime	 security	 has	 not	 often	 been	 obvious	 (Klein,	 2011).	 As	 she	 has	 correctly	suggested:	"The	term	‘maritime	security’	has	various	meanings	which	depend	on	who	uses	the	term	or	in	what	context	it	is	mentioned"	(Klein,	2011).	The	concept	of	navigational	security	is	correlated	to	maritime	security	in	a	few	ways.	IMO	and	its	Maritime	Safety	Committee	(MSC)	act	as	the	most	important	competent	international	body	 for	 elaboration	 of	 rules	 and	 policy.	 Especially,	 the	 insecurity	 of	 sea	 lane	 is	 the	 most	prominent	fear	of	the	states,	as	it	can	engage	national	and	environmental	interests.	Maritime	security	is		associated	with	social	crisis,	given	that	shipping	companies,	the	maritime	industry,	and	their	workers	are	contingent	targets	as	well	as	maritime	crimes	(e.g.	of	pirates,	terrorists,	weapons,	illicit	goods,	trafficking	of	persons	or	collaboration	with	actors	of	violence)	(Bueger,	2015).	The	European	Union	Maritime	Security	Strategy	document	has	declared	the	list	of	set	of	threats	 and	 risks	 such	 as	maritime	 armed	 robbery	 and	 piracy,	 trafficking	 of	 persons,	 arms,	narcotics	 and,	 smuggling	 of	 migrants	 and	 cargos,	 in	 addition	 to	 illegal	 and	 unregulated	archaeological	research,	environmental	risks,	with	unsustainable	and	 illegal	using	of	natural	and	 marine	 resources,	 threats	 to	 biodiversity,	 IUU8	 fishing	 and	 so	 on	 (UNION,	 2014).		Moreover,	 the	 national	 strategy	 of	 the	 UK	 2014	 according	 to	 its	 maritime	 security	 only	identified	 "maritime	 security	 risks",	 and	 the	 UK	 bases	 the	 risks	 identified	 in	 the	 National	Security	 Risk	 Assessment	 (NSRA)	 on	 those	 which	 mostly	 cause	 considerable	 harm	 and	destruction	to	the	UK,	in	particular,	disruption	to	vital	maritime	trade	routes	as	a	outcome	of	warfare,	 delinquency,	 piracy	 or	 changes	 in	 international	 rules;	 cyber-attacks;	 people	smuggling	 and	human	 trafficking	 (UK	Government,	 2014).	 For	 the	 first	 time	 in	 this	 study,	maritime	insecurity	elements	are	classified	into	two	major	groups	based	on	human	risks	and	threats	to	maritime	security	in	the	maritime	zones,	one	is	direct	insecurity	elements	and	another	is	indirect	insecurity	elements.		Basically,	risks	or	threats	which	endanger	maritime	security	extremely	such	as	piracy	or	armed	 robberies,	 belong	 to	 the	 first	 group.	The	 second	 group	has	potential	 threats	 or	 risks	which	do	not	hamper	directly,	but	 they	 lead	 to	provoking	national	 security	of	 coastal	 states	increasing	 regional	 tension	 or	 to	 endanger	 navigational	 systems	 at	 sea	 or	 inland,	 such	 as	continued	presence	of	warships,	Sanction	or	cyber-attacks.	On	the	other	hand,	such	threats	or	risks	 could	 inflict	 serious	 damage	 on	 passing	 ships	 or	 the	 security	 of	 coastal	 states.	 It	 is	necessary	to	note	that	there	are	other	direct	elements	concerning	maritime	security	such	as	terrorist	 attacks,	 delimitation	 disputes,	 conflict	 between	 States	 and	 so	 on,	 however,	 this	research	is	devoted	to	the	most	important	elements	namely	piracy	and	armed	robbery	as	the	most	remarkable	direct	elements	and	biggest	concern	to	all	states	in	marine	transportation	as	well	 as	 the	 hazardous	 and	 continued	 presence	 of	 external	 State,	 therefore,	 these	 elements	should	be	treated	as	urgent	and	top-priority	matters.	Generally	speaking,	maritime	 insecurity	may	result	 from	"Threatening	Actions",	"Acts	of	Aggression"	 or	 "Breach	 of	 Coastal	 State's	 Laws	 and	 Regulations"	 whether	 or	 not	 direct	 or	indirect.	 For	 this	 purpose,	 we	will	 encounter	 to	maritime	 insecurity	 if	 these	 infringements	become	 prejudicial	 to	 the	 political	 independence,	 territorial	 integrity	 or	 sovereignty	 of	 the	coastal	State	at	 the	National	Security	Level	on	one	hand	and	prejudicial	 to	 the	 International	Peace,	International	Trade	or	Good	Order	at	the	International	Security	Level	on	other	hand.	It	
																																								 																				8 Illegal,	Unregulated	and	Unreported.	(IUU)	
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may	 be	 concluded	 that	 maritime	 security	 would	 be	 monitored	 and	 controlled	 for	 any	 act	whether	direct	or	indirect,	which	would	endanger	or	threaten	the	security	of	a	coastal	state,	the	sea	lanes,	the	marine	environment,	vessels,	property	or	persons.	It	is	necessary	to	mention	that	 the	 security	 status	 of	 each	 area	 depending	 on	 the	 potential	 of	 threats	 and	 risks	 is	different.		
The	UN	Secretary General	Report	on	the	Oceans	and	the	Law	of	the	
Sea		 There	is	 increasing	concern	about	threats	to	maritime	security	in	the	world.	Despite	the	freedom	 of	 navigation,	 the	 presence	 of	 the	 warships	 of	 some	 States	 is	 considered	 a	 threat	especially	in	territorial	waters.	Consequently,	it	results	in	actions	which	disturb	coastal	state	security	or	regional	security	therein.	Hence,	it	seems	a	precise	definition	would	have	to	take	into	account	the	location	and	circumstances	of	every	region	(Attard,	2014). In	this	regard,	it	is	interesting	to	glim	to	the	2008	Report	of	the	UN	Secretary	General	on	the	Oceans	and	the	Law	of	the	Sea.	Mr.	Ban	Ki-Moon	affirmed	in	his	report:	"There	is	no	universally	accepted	definition	of	the	term	"maritime	security."	Much	like	the	concept	of	"national	security,"	it	may	differ	in	meaning,	 depending	 on	 the	 context	 and	 the	 users"	 (United	 Nations,	 2008).	 Besides,	 in	 this	Report,	he	mentions	the	following	seven	remarkable	threats	for	maritime	security:		1.	Piracy	and	armed	robbery	against	ships	(United	Nations,	2008);	2.	 Terrorist	 acts	 concerning	 shipping,	 offshore	 installations,	 and	 other	 maritime	 interests	(United	Nations,	2008);	3.Illegal	trafficking	in	arms	and	weapons	of	mass	destruction	(United	Nations,	2008);	4.	Unlawful	traffic	of	narcotic	drugs	and	psychotropic	substances	(United	Nations,	2008);	5.	Smuggling	and	human	traffic	by	sea	(United	Nations,	2008);	6.	Illegal	and	unreported	and	unregulated	fishing	(United	Nations,	2008);		7.	International	and	unlawful	damage	to	the	marine	environment	(United	Nations,	2008).		
The	Viewpoint	of	UNCLOS	and	IMO	on	the	Maritime	Security		 Customary	 international	 law	 and	 UNCLOS	 have	 recognized	 three	 vital	 navigational	regimes.	 In	 this	 connection,	 for	 the	maintenance	 of	maritime	 security	 has	 recognized	 three	sensitive	 navigational	 regimes	 by	UNCLOS	 as	 1)	 innocent	 passage	 2)	 archipelagic	 sea	 lanes	passage	 3)	 transit	 passage	 (Attard,	 2014).	 Innocent	 passage	 regime	 which	 exists	 in	archipelagic	and	the	territorial	sea	 is	able	to	provide	a	kind	of	national	security,	however	 in	the	case	of	transit	passage	is	not.	Looking	back	into	UNCLOS	articles	17	to	22	and	100	to	111,	in	fact,	UNCLOS	deal	with	some	of	the	insecurity	elements	of	the	sea.	In	particular,	provisions	contained	 in	 article	 19	 (2).	 It	 also	 should	 be	 noted	 that	 IMO's	 instruments	 have	 implicitly	distinguished	between	the	terms	"maritime	security"	and	"maritime	safety."	As	IMO	considers	ships	 and	 cargo	 protection,	 passengers,	 crew	 and	 the	 marine	 environment	 under	 term	"maritime	 security"	 while	 maritime	 safety	 concerns	 accidents	 at	 sea.	 For	 instance,	 the	Convention	 for	 the	 Suppression	 of	 Unlawful	 Acts	 against	 the	 Safety	 of	Maritime	Navigation	(The	SUA	Convention)	pertain	to	“security”	at	sea	while	the	International	Convention	for	the	Safety	 of	 Life	 at	 Sea	 (SOLAS),	 pertain	 to	 “safety”	 at	 sea.	 It	 is	 easy	 to	 recognize	 and	 discern	exactly	what	each	of	the	conventions	refer	because	one	is	seeking	to	protect	humans	against	attacks	by	humans	with	criminal	intents	while	the	other	is	designed	to	protect	humans	from	
Zohourian	I	A	New	Maritime	Security	Architecture	for	the	21st	Century	Maritime	Silk	Road	
Revista	de	Estudos	Constitucionais,	Hermenêutica	e	Teoria	do	Direito	(RECHTD),	12(2):239-262	247	
accidents	 caused	 by	 unsafe	 ships.	 (Mejia,	 2003)	 In	 fact,	 "maritime	 security"	 and	 "maritime	safety"	 depend	 on	 human	 unlawful	 acts	 and	 environmental	 conditions	 or	 human	 errors	respectively.	However,	 as	 IMO	has	 truly	distinguished	between	 the	 terms	 "maritime	 safety"	and	"maritime	security",	this	research	does	not	address	threats	and	risks	concerning	maritime	safety.	 Generally	 speaking,	 maritime	 insecurity	 would	 be	 any	 action	 against	 the	 maritime	public	 order	 or	 peace,	whether	 or	 not	 direct	 or	 indirect.	 Generally,	 insecurity	 in	 the	 sea	 or	straits	may	be	classified	 into	different	 types.	 In	view	of	 the	above,	 it	may	be	concluded	 that	maritime	 security	 would	 be	 any	 act	 whether	 direct	 or	 indirect,	 which	 would	 endanger	 or	threaten	 the	 security	 of	 coastal	 States,	 the	 sea	 lanes,	 the	 marine	 environment,	 vessels,	property	or	persons	(Attard,	2014).		
Armed	Robbery	and	Piracy:	Definition	and	Jurisdiction		 As	 it	 is	 mentioned	 above,	 piracy	 and	 armed	 robbery	 are	 the	 main	 direct	 elements	 in	maritime	security	classifications.	These	direct	threats	and	risks	are	serious	and	potentially	for	some	 of	 the	 international	 straits	 or	 sea	 lanes	 in	 particular	 in	 MSR	 courses.	 Despite	 other	threats	and	risks,	these	two	elements	include	the	biggest	risk	and	share	for	the	safe	trade	and	the	 human	 life.	 Universal	 jurisdiction	 has	 recognized	 them	 from	 an	 international	 law	perspective	 to	 combat	 piracy.	 However,	 the	 jurisdiction	 realm	 is	 limited	 to	 Exclusive	Economic	Zone	 (EEZ)	 and	 the	High	 Sea.	While	 armed	 robbery	 takes	place	 in	 territorial	 and	internal	 waters,	 consequently,	 it	 will	 be	 under	 coastal	 State	 jurisdiction.	 Therefore,	international	 law,	 although	 proposes	 the	 principle	 of	 cooperation,	 the	 major	 burden	 for	combating	piracy	has	been	 imposed	on	 the	coastal	states.	Since	 the	elements	such	as	piracy	and	armed	robbery	play	 the	 important	role	 in	 the	maritime	 insecurity,	both	of	 them	will	be	analyzed	 below	 according	 to	 the	 aspects	 of	 international	 law	documents	 including	UNCLOS	and	IMO.	UNCLOS	in	article	101	states	that	piracy	consists	of	any	of	the	following	acts:	a)	 any	 illegal	 acts	 of	 violence	 or	 detention,	 or	 any	 act	 of	 depredation	 committed	 for	private	ends	by	the	crew	or	the	passengers	of	a	private	ship	or	a	private	aircraft	and	directed;	b)	 on	 the	 high	 seas,	 against	 another	 ship	 or	 aircraft,	 or	 against	 persons	 or	 property	 on	board	of	a	ship	or	aircraft;	c)	 against	 a	 ship,	 aircraft,	 persons	or	property	 in	a	place	outside	 the	 jurisdiction	of	 any	state;	d)	 any	 act	 of	 voluntary	 participation	 in	 the	 operation	 of	 a	 ship	 or	 of	 an	 aircraft	 with	knowledge	of	facts	to	make	it	a	pirate	ship	or	aircraft;	e)	any	act	of	inciting	or	of	intentionally	facilitating	an	act	described	in	subparagraph	(a)	or	(b).	From	 a	 brief	 overview	 of	 the	 article	 101,	 it	 could	 be	 deduced	 that	 a	 piratical	 act	 could	occur	three	main	conditions	are	necessary.	The	first	condition	means	that	the	committed	act	is	done	 for	 "private	ends."	The	second	condition	 is	 that	 the	crew	or	passengers	of	a	private	ship	commit	and	direct	the	action.	The	third	condition	refers	to	the	event	location;	on	the	high	sea	or	outside	 including	EEZ.9	Hence,	acts	which	happen	in	 internal	waters	or	the	territorial	sea	or	off	coastal	State	cannot	be	covered	by	the	international	rules	on	piracy	(Jesus,	2003).	According	 to	 Shaw	 (2008),	 piracy	 and	war	 crime	explicitly	 lie	 in	 the	 realm	of	universal	jurisdiction	and	the	state	has	a	jurisdiction	to	prosecute	and	punish	the	offenders,	despite	the	place	 of	 commission	 of	 the	 crime	 and	 the	 victim	 or	 the	 accused	 nationality.	 Universal	
																																								 																				9 Although	article	101	has	not	referred	to	the	EEZ,	by	virtue	of	article	58,	paragraph	2,	illegal	acts	of	violence	committed	in	this	zone	may	also	be	considered	as	acts	of	piracy.	
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jurisdiction	 has	 been	 recognized	with	 regard	 to	 crimes	 of	 piracy	 by	UNCLOS,	where	 article	105	states	that:	"On	the	high	seas,	or	in	any	other	place	outside	the	jurisdiction	of	any	State,	every	State	may	seize	a	pirate	ship	or	aircraft,	or	a	ship	or	aircraft	taken	by	piracy	and	under	the	control	of	pirates,	and	arrest	the	persons	and	seize	the	property	on	board.	The	courts	of	the	State	which	carried	out	the	seizure	may	decide	upon	the	penalties	to	be	imposed,	and	may	also	determine	the	action	to	be	taken	with	regard	to	the	ships,	aircraft	or	property,	subject	to	the	rights	of	third	parties	acting	in	good	faith."	The	seizure	of	the	pirate	vessel	must	be	carried	out	 "...	 Only	 by	warships	 or	military	 aircraft,	 or	 other	 ships	 or	 aircraft	 clearly	marked	 and	identifiable	 as	 being	 on	 government	 service	 and	 authorized	 to	 that	 effect.	 (UNCLOS,	 Article	107)	 One	 of	 the	 significant	 limitations	 on	 UNCLOS	 is	 that	 seizing	 and	 arresting	 will	 be	unenforceable	if	pirates	move	to	the	jurisdiction	of	another	state.	Nevertheless,	coastal	states	should	 consider	 the	most	 extreme	punishments	 to	prevent	piracy	under	 their	 criminal	 law.	For	instance,	13	pirates	got	death	penalty	for	the	killing	23	members	of	the	crew	in	January,	2000	by	the	Chinese	courts	(MO,	2002).		As	 it	 has	 already	 been	 discussed,	 all	 States	 are	 entitled	 to	 universal	 jurisdiction	 over	combating	 piracy	 on	 the	 high	 seas,	 or	 at	 another	 place	 outside	 the	 jurisdiction	 of	 States.	However,	 most	 piracy	 incidents	 take	 place	 in	 the	 archipelagic	 waters,	 territorial	 sea	 or	 in	internal	waters.10	 IMO	 first	provided	 the	understanding	of	 the	 term	"armed	robbery	against	ships"	in	the	Resolution	in	2001	(IMO,	2001).	In	reply	to	the	request	to	the	MSC	to	revise	and	update	Resolution	A.922	(22),	the	IMO	Assembly	adopted	Resolution	A.	1025	(26)	in	2009.	(J.	Ashley	Roach,	2011)	Accordingly,	the	definition	of	“armed	robbery”	was	revised	to	include:	1.	“Any	illegal	act	of	violence	or	detention	or	any	act	of	depredation,	or	threat	thereof,	other	than	an	act	of	piracy,	committed	for	private	ends	and	directed	against	a	ship	or	against	persons	or	property	 on	 board	 of	 a	 ship,	 within	 a	 State's	 internal	 waters,	 archipelagic	 waters	 and	territorial	 sea;	 2.	 Any	 act	 of	 inciting	 or	 of	 intentionally	 facilitating	 an	 act	 described	 above.”	(IMO,	2009)		In	the	revised	resolution	the	element	of	"private	ends"	has	been	recognized	as	a	requirement	to	constitute	an	act	of	armed	robbery.	Moreover,	Resolution	A.	1025	(26)	states	that	States	should	take	measures	because	it	can	be	needed	to	increase	their	jurisdiction	over	the	 offenses	 of	 piracy	 and	 armed	 robbery	 against	 ships,	 it	 also	 asks	 states	 to	modify	 their	domestic	 legislation	 and	 they	 should	 pay	 attention	 to	 suitable	 penalties	 when	 drafting	legislation	 on	 piracy.	 This	 resolution	 also	 continues	 to	 encourage	 all	 countries	 to	 put	 into	practice	the	provisions	of	UNCLOS,	the	SUA	Convention,	and	its	Protocols	(IMO,	2009).	In	the	years	since	the	adoption	of	UNCLOS,	in	1988,	IMO	succeed	in	the	context	of	its	goals	to	reach	another	 prominent	 achievement	 such	 as	 the	 SUA	 Convention	 and	 its	 relevant	 Protocols.	Despite	the	adoption	of	this	convention,	since	the	Achille	Lauro	incident,	it	seems	the	offenses	contained	in	the	SUA	Convention	are	not	restricted	solely	to	terrorist	actions.	It	is	interesting	to	note	that	not	only	the	SUA	Convention	has	designated	for	"the	Suppression	of	Unlawful	Acts	Against	the	Safety	of	Maritime	Navigation"	but	the	member	of	the	1988	SUA	Convention	are	necessary	 for	 recognizing	 offences	 contained	 in	 this	 Convention	 as	 a	 crime	 under	 their	domestic	 laws	 and	 provide	 appropriate	 penalties	 according	 to	 the	 serious	 nature	 of	 those	offences.	 Moreover,	 by	 virtue	 of	 article	 10	 (1)	 State	 parties	 are	 obliged	 to	 "extradite	 or	prosecute"	the	offender.	(Attard,	2014) It	is	obvious	that	any	insecurity	must	be	eliminated	by	cooperation	among	States.		What	is	important,	 the	 UNCLOS,	 the	 SUA	 Convention	 and	 its	 protocol,	 Resolution	 A.	 1025	 (26)	 and	other	 international	 instruments	 concerning	 maritime	 security	 are	 considered	 as	complementary	 law	 and	 regulation.	 Besides,	 all	 of	 them	 are	 seeking	 a	 common	 goal	 that	 is	
																																								 																				10	ICC	International	Maritime	Bureau,	Piracy	and	Armed	Robbery	against	Ships,	Annual	Report,	1	January-	31	December	2009,	3.	
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keeping	 peace	 and	 combating	 insecurity,	 whether	 under	 the	 coastal	 State	 jurisdiction	 or	beyond.	 Despite	 weaknesses	 and	 deficiencies	 contained	 in	 the	 legal	 documents,	 they	 have	codified	 sufficient	 law	 and	 regulations.	 It	 seems	 there	 is	 no	 fundamental	 deficiency	 of	 legal	provisions.	 Hence,	 the	 Singapore	 and	 Malacca	 Straits	 act	 as	 a	 vital	 choke	 point	 for	 the	international	 economic	 need	 for	 the	 substantial	 strategy	 to	 ensure	 security.	 The	 following	material	 is	 the	 summary	of	 the	various	 solutions	 suggested	by	 scientists	 to	 solve	 the	piracy	problem	in	the	Straits.		
Possible	Options	to	Combat	Maritime	Piracy		 Basically,	 suppressing	 piracy	 is	 totally	 exaggerated.	 In	 this	 regard,	 there	 are	 various	options	offered	by	some	scholars,	but	none	alone	can	completely	eliminate	piracy.	However,	it	can	be	greatly	controlled	and	declined	by	practical	measures	and	all-around	cooperation.		
(a)	Adoption	of	International	Treaty		Some	 scholars	believe	 in	 the	option	of the	 conclusion	of	 an	 international	 convention	 to	contend	 piracy	 in	 the	 context	 of	 the	 UNCLOS	 by	 IMO.	 The	 treaty	 should	 establish	 an	international	or	regional	mechanism	under	universal	principles	for	piracy	control	(MO,	2002).	However,	it	seems	this	method	is	not	effective.	First,	the	process	of	codifying	an	international	treaty	 needs	 spending	 long	 time.	 Second,	 there	 is	 no	 guarantee	 for	 ratifying	 such	 a	 piracy	treaty	by	some	Southeast	Asian	countries	or	other	target	countries.			
(b)	The	International	Bounty	Hunters	(IBH)		Bounty	hunters	are	described	from	a	controversial	legal	doctrine,	namely	the	male	captus	rule,	moreover,	no	cases	have	been	brought		before	international	judicial	or	arbitral	tribunals	regarding	 the	 question	 of	 jurisdiction	 over	 kidnapped	 persons	 (Wilske	&	 Schiller,	 1988)	 as	well	 as,	 there	 is	no	basis	 in	 the	 international	 law	and	 international	 customs	 concerning	 the	male	captus	rule.	(Fellmeth	&	Horwitz,	2009)	It	is	obvious	that	abduction	leads	to	infringing	the	State’s	territorial	sovereignty,	undoubtedly,	it	is	a	straight	violation	of	international	law.	It	is	necessary	to	mention	that	the	assertion	of	jurisdiction	on	adduction	has	been	an	aspect	for	determination	by	the	national	court,	as	well	as	various	practices	have	been	seen	by	domestic	courts.	For	instance,	The	South	African	courts,	the	United	States,	the	New	Zealand	courts	and	the	 French	 courts	 have	 had	 different	 practices.	 As	 for	 prior	 practices,	 it	 would	 not	 be	 so	difficult	to	construe	where	there	is	no	established	rule	of	customary	international	 law	(Sein,	2004).	 It	 is	 impossible	 to	 imagine	 a	 State,	 including	 Indonesia	 and	 Malaysia,	 surrender	sovereign	 rights	 to	 private	 bounty	 hunters	 to	 arrest	 own	 citizens	 if	 they	 are	 suspected	 on	dealing	 with	 piracy.	 Another	 issue,	 mentioned	 by	 Ms.	 Bornick,	 is	 that	 use	 of	 international	bounty	 hunters	 could	 lead	 to	 the	 bounty	 hunters	 only	 protect	 ships	 belonging	 to	 rich	companies	 or	 wealthy	 states	 and	 disregard	 attacks	 on	 poor	 vessels.	 (Woolley,	 2010).	 Any	amendment	to	UNCLOS	is	subject	to	ratification	by	states.	Another	suggestion	according	to	the	piracy	 problem	 in	 the	 Straits	 is	 to	 amend	 the	 UNCLOS	 definition	 of	 piracy.	 	 (See	 UNCLOS,	Articles	 315	 and	 316)	 Also,	 this	 presence	 within	 territorial	 sea	 of	 coastal	 country	 would	violate	its	sovereignty.		In	light	of	above,	there	is	no	doubt	that	piracy	and	armed	robbery	are	the	most	sensitive	concern	 about	 maritime	 security,	 therefore,	 they	 lay	 in	 the	 class	 of	 direct	 elements	 on	
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navigation	 security.	 The	 respective	 instruments	 attempted	 to	 regulate	 some	definitions	 and	jurisdiction	 of	 states	 with	 respect	 to	 fighting	 on	 piracy	 and	 armed	 robbery.	 Therefore,	generally,	most	of	the	insecurity	at	the	sea	consider	as	unlawful	acts	because	such	acts	lead	to	insecurity	 and	 disorder	 during	 traffic.	 As	 it	 has	 been	 discussed	 above,	 the	 SUA	 Convention	regarding	 maritime	 security	 represented	 a	 serious	 step	 in	 the	 development	 of	 maritime	security	 law,	 the	aim	of	 the	 law	 is	not	 limited	 to	any	of	 the	crimes	 listed	 in	Article	3	 to	any	particular	 location	and	without	 regard	 to	 the	 location	of	 the	attack	on	water.	Moreover,	 the	SUA	Convention	has	taken	a	major	step	forward,	including	the	apprehension,	conviction,	and	punishment	 of	 offenders.	 States	 should	 view	optimistically	 to	 the	present	 legal	 instruments	despite	 all	 the	weaknesses	or	deficiency	 in	 regard	 to	a	 legal	 instrument.	 It	 is	 time	 to	 take	a	step	 forward	 to	 the	 establishment	 of	 sustainable	 security	measures	within	 the	 sea	 lanes	 in	particular	toward	rising	security	of	MSR.		
(c)	 Joint	 Patrolling	 by	 the	 Non-Littoral	 States	 in	 the	 Malacca	 and	 Singapore	
Striates			The	 United	 States	 presence	 in	 the	 South	 China	 Sea	 appeared	 under	 the	 pretense	 of	maintaining	freedom	of	navigation	and,	its	global	war	on	terroristic	acts.	As	it	will	be	seen	in	the	following	sections	the	USA's	sovereignty	is	based	on	the	full-scale	presence	policy	in	the	sensitive	 area	 and	 terrorist-building.	 Concerning	 this	 purpose,	 the	 Bush	 administration	lunched	three	 following	main	Initiative:	a)	 the	Container	Security	 Initiative	(CSI)	on	 January	2002,	b)	the	Proliferation	Security	Initiative	(PSI)	on	May	31,	2003,	c)	the	Regional	Maritime	Security	 Initiative	 (RMSI)	 on	 31	 March	 2004.	 The	 first	 and	 the	 second	 Initiatives	 are	worldwide	 in	 scope	 and	 the	 last	 one	 is	 directed	 particularly	 for	 the	 Straits	 of	Malacca	 and	Singapore.	 (Rosenberg	 &	 Chung,	 2008)	 	 Under	 the	 RMSI	 the	 United	 States	 offered	 sending	Marines	to	patrol	the	Straits.		It	 seems	 the	 Westphalian	 notion	 of	 sovereignty	 is	 dying	 down	 because	 of	 the	 U.S.	initiatives.	Moreover,	the	principle	of	non-interference	in	the	inherent	security	of	a	state	as	an	ASEAN's	 key	 norm	 is	 threatened	 through	 these	 U.S	 initiatives.	 (Mak,	 2006)	 Among	 three	littoral	states	Singapore	is	the	only	participant	of	this	idea.	Both	states	Indonesia	and	Malaysia	are	against	 the	being	there	of	external	armed	forces	on	the	territory	of	 the	Straits.	(Prakash	Karat,	2007)	 	On	14	 June,	2004,	 the	minister	 in	 the	P.M’s	department,	Datuk	Seri	Mohamed	Nazri	Abdul	Aziz,	proclaimed	in	the	parliament	that	Malaysia	is	going	to	have	its	variant	of	the	U.S.	 coast	 guard	 to	 patrol	 and	 safeguard	 security	 in	 the	 Straits	 of	 Malacca.	 (Kuppuswamy,	2004)		Similarly,	Admiral	Bernard	Kent	Sondakh,	Chief	of	Indonesian	Navy,	stated	“Indonesia	deems	it	is	not	necessary	to	include	troops	from	outside	countries	including	the	United	States	–	to	be	involved	in	safeguarding	the	strategic	waterway”.	(Prakash	Karat,	2007)	Three	littoral	states,	although	they	have	different	perspectives	on	what	threatened	their	sovereignty,	they	have	a	common	objective	to	protect	their	sovereignty	from	external	states.	(Woolley,	2010)	Singapore	regards	any	threat	that	 lead	to	endanger	the	trading	flow	on	this	territory	 as	 a	 direct	 threat	 to	 its	 state	 interest.	 (Storey,	 2008).	 However,	 piracy	 is	 not	considered	as	a	serious	threat	to	the	security	in	Malaysia.	Instead,	the	illegal	immigration,	the	trafficking	in	people,	narcotics,	small	arms	are	more	important	threats	to	its	security.	(Storey,	2008)	Indonesia,	similarly,	is	of	the	opinion	that	piracy	is	not	such	an	extreme	challenge	to	its	maritime	 security.	 From	 Indonesia's	 point	 of	 view	 illegal	 fishing	 and	 smuggling	 are	 the	 key	maritime	 security	 challenges.	 (Storey,	 2008)	 It	 should	 be	 mentioned,	 Malaysian	 foreign	minister,	Syed	Hamid	Albar	Malaysia,	stated	that	"security	concerns	should	not	be	used	as	an	excuse	to	compromise	 its	sovereignty".	 (Mak,	2011)	Overall,	 Indonesia	and	Malaysia	believe	
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the	 U.S.	 military	 presence	 in	 the	 Straits	 is	 an	 intervention	 	 and	 an	 infringement	 of	 their	national	sovereignty.	(Storey,	2008)	They	explicitly	rejected	the	presence	of	foreign	forces	in	the	Straits.	(Ganesan,	2008)	In	 the	 aftermath	 of	 Indonesia's	 proposal	with	 regard	 to	 trilateral	 coordinated	 patrol	 in	June,	 2004,	 (Storey,	 2008)	 the	 Malaysia-	 Singapore-Indonesia	 (MALSINDO)	 coordinated	patrols	were	launched	by	the	three	coastal	states	on	July	20,	2004.	(Wu,	2010)	In	April,	2006,	Standard	 Operation	 Procedure	 (SOP)	 was	 signed	 by	 three	 countries	 for	 purpose	 of	strengthening	their	military	cooperation(Storey,	2008).	Then	the	Malacca	Straits	Patrols	(MSP	were	 formalized	 to	 guarantee	 the	 security	 of	 the	Malacca	 Strait.	MSP	 comprise	 the	Malacca	Straits	Sea	Patrol	(MSSP),	the	"Eyes-in-the-Sky"	(EiS)	Combined	Maritime	Air	Patrols,	as	well	as	 the	 Intelligence	 Exchange	 Group	 (IEG).	 (MINDEF,	 2016)	 It	 is	 interesting	 to	 note	 that,	according	 to	 the	 April	 2006	 agreement	MALSINDO,	 ships	may	 implement	 the	 right	 of	 "hot	pursuit"	into	the	maritime	belt	of	participating	states	up	to	five	nautical	miles	in	the	sovereign	waters	of	another	state-participant.	 (Woolley,	2010)	As	 it	has	already	been	mentioned,	 “hot	pursuit"	 can	 just	 be	 continued	 outside	 the	 contiguous	 zone	 or	 the	 territorial	 sea.	 (UNLOS,	Article	111,	1)	Also	this	right	ends,	when	the	offending	ship	enters	 its	own	or	a	third	state’s	territorial	waters.	(UNLOS,	Article	111,	3)	It	should	be	noted,	the	agreement	of	2006	granted	this	prominence	only	to	MALSINDO.		In	sum,	although	the	primary	goal	of	MALSINDO	was	not	really	 to	harness	piracy,	 three	coastal	states	forestalled	likely	external	state	intervention	in	the	Malacca	Straits.	(Mak,	2006)	Moreover,	they	counteracted	at	the	same	time	with	the	USA's	objective	for	regime-building	in	the	both	Straits	and	the	South	China	Sea.	Moreover,	Indonesia	and	Malaysia	have	proved	their	willpower	to	protect	their	sovereignty.		
(d)	Establishment	of	Uniform	Systems	for	Ships	Registry	and	Selling	Goods		The	 author	 is	 of	 the	 opinion	 that	 to	 prevent	 and	 eliminate	 the	 factors	 involved	 in	insecurity	might	be	the	best	way	to	combat	any	social	or	international	phenomenon.	For	this	purpose,	 the	 author	 gives	 suggestions	 in	 this	 section.	 In	 addition	 to	 revising	 domestic	 laws	concerning	 punishments,	 establishing	 integrated	 registration	 systems	 for	 controlling	 and	preventing	piracy	can	be	very	effective.	 	The	1982	convention	requires	for	the	“genuine	link	between	 the	 State	 and	 the	 ship”.	 (UNLOS,	 Article	 9,	 1)	 Also	 the	 flag	 state	 shall	 “effectively	exercise	its	jurisdiction	and	control	in	administrative,	technical	and	social	matters	over	ships	flying	 its	 flag”.	 (UNLOS,	 Article	 94,	 1)	 States	 have	 discretion	 to	 fix	 the	 conditions	 of	registration.	The	registered	vessel	 is	subject	of	 the	State	 jurisdiction	and	therefore	the	State	takes	over	international	and	national	responsibilities	regarding	the	vessel.	(Rogers,	2010)	Those	vessels,	which	have	not	been	 registered	until	 the	given	 time,	must	be	 registered.	Vessels	in	all	sizes,	applications	and	makes	including,	VLCC/	deep	draft,	Tanker	vessels,	LNG	Carriers,	Fishing	Vessels	Cargo	Vessels,	Livestock	Carriers,	Bulk	carriers,	Tug/Tow,	Container	Vessels	 and	 boats,	 drilling	 vessels,	 research	 ships,	 even	 passenger	 ships,	 should	 hold	individual	authentic	 identification	documents.	 It	 is	 important	that	all	vessels	 in	any	size	and	applications	must	be	equipped	with	the	GPS	system.	Therefore,	integrated	system	of	any	state	to	 be	 able	 to	 trace	 the	 last	 location	 of	 those	 vessels	 which	 are	 under	 its	 jurisdiction.	 For	example,	if	an	act	of	piracy	occurs	in	waters	under	the	state's	jurisdiction.	This	state	can	track	the	latest	position	of	all	vessels	registered	under	its	jurisdiction.	Buying	and	selling	any	small	boats	 must	 also	 be	 recorded	 in	 a	 notary	 public's	 office	 as	 well	 as	 under	 the	 control	 of	government.	 Moreover,	 all	 shipbuilding	 factories	 and	 associated	 factories	 including	mechanical	 and	 electronic	 equipment	 must	 be	 strictly	 monitored	 by	 the	 government.	 An	
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integrated	 system	 should	 also	 be	 designed	 and	 implemented	 to	 monitor	 commodities	 and	goods.	All	goods	must	have	a	single	serial	number	so	that	the	buyer	could	track	the	accuracy	of	the	goods	through	the	governmental	competent	authorities.	Hence,	if	the	integrated	system	could	be	adopted	for	banning	the	sale	of	pirated	goods	and	for	the	vessel	registration,	it	can	be	a	 problem	 for	 pirates	 to	 get	 a	 potential	 buyer	 to	 sell	 pirated	 commodities	 and	 goods	 and	 a	hijacked	 vessel.	 It	 should	 be	 noted	 such	 an	 integrated	 system	 will	 not	 only	 result	 in	 high	security	 level	 in	 the	 straits	 and	 SCS,	 but	 it	 will	 be	 helpful	 to	 decrease	 Indonesian	 and	Malaysian	 major	 concerns	 such	 as	 illegal	 fishing,	 smuggling,	 trafficking	 or	 other	 relevant	crimes	in	this	region.		
Impact	 of	 the	 Indirect	 Element	 on	 the	 Maritime	 Security	 and	
"Doctrine	of	No	Sheriff"		
(a)	Indirect	Element	of	Security	on	the	Maritime	Security		As	it	was	already	mentioned,	effective	elements	in	maritime	security	can	be	classified	into	two	groups,	one	is	direct	elements	and	another	is	indirect	elements.	There	are	different	types	of	 indirect	element	 involving	 in	navigation	security	but	 the	most	 important	and	challenging	indirect	 element	 that	 has	 been	 neglected	 by	 scholars	 about	 this	 matter	 is	 the	 role	 of	 the	external	state	destabilizing	presence.	According	to	UNCLOS,	the	coastal	states	can	change	the	law	and	regulations	according	 to	 innocent	passage	 through	 the	 territorial	 sea.	 	UNCLOS	has	recognized	 at	 least	 12	 items	 which	 indicate	 some	 activities	 are	 prejudicial	 to	 the	 security,	good	 order	 or	 peace	 of	 the	 coastal	 state	 in	 the	 Article	 19	 (2).	 UNCLOS	 (Article	 21,	 4)	 also	stresses	 that	 foreign	 ships	 must	 comply	 with	 the	 necessary	 laws	 and	 regulations.	 In	 this	connection,	 any	 breach	 of	 coastal	 state’s	 laws	 and	 regulations	 may	 be	 considered	 as	 an	insecurity	 factor.	 For	 example,	 entrance	 within	 internal	 water	 without	 prior	 authorization	from	a	coastal	State,	to	dispatch	spy	unmanned	aircraft	to	 land	territory	of	the	coastal	state,	which	 interfere	 with	 the	 systems	 of	 satellite	 or	 radar	 of	 the	 coastal	 State,	 to	 affect	 the	protection	or	security	of	the	coastal	State.	Therefore,	the	most	remarkable	indirect	element	in	maritime	security	would	be	the	continued	and	purposeless	presence	of the	external	state	in	a	given	 area.	 It	 is	 necessary	 to	 mention,	 indirect	 elements	 include	 other	 elements,	 such	 as	spying	through	passing	foreign	ships	and	submarines,	currency	war	and	arousing	the	coastal	state	through	provocative	actions.	Also,	the	insecurity	caused	by	the	presence	of	an	external	state	depends	on	the	geographical	and	geopolitical	location	of	each	region	and	is	different.	In	the	 following,	 the	 fundamental	 importance	 of	 the	 indirect	 element	 in	 maritime	 security	 is	explained.	Actually,	 the	 sequential	 presence	 of	 the	 USA	 is	 both	 implausible	 and	 inconsistent	 with	maritime	security	and	national	security	of	the	relevant	coastal	state	as	events	occurring	in	the	Persian	 Gulf	 have	 expressly	 demonstrated	 it.	 	 For	 instance,	 the	 case	 between	 Iran	 and	 the	United	States	on	July	3,	1988,	civilian	aircraft	of	Iran	including	290	innocent	passengers	and	crew	 was	 destroyed	 by	 the	 U.S.	 naval	 units	 while	 they	 unlawfully	 intruded	 into	 the	 Iran's	internal	and	territorial	waters.11	 In	addition	to	the	violation	of	the	Islamic	Republic	of	Iran's	sovereignty,	the	United	States	violated	other	international	law	and	rules	such	as:	provisions	of	the	Chicago	Convention	(ICAO,	1948)	and	the	Montreal	Convention,(ICAO,	1971)	Article	2(4)	
																																								 																				11 Flight	655,	as	a	commercial	flight	that	was	on	a	Tehran-Bandar	Abbas-Dubai	route.	The	Iranian	Airbus	A300	during	flying	in	Iranian	airspace	over	the	territorial	sea	of	Iran	in	the	Persian	Gulf	on	its	usual	flight	path,	Was	Shot	Down	by	the	American	Navy	Guided	Missile	Cruiser	
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of	the	United	Nations	Charter,	as	well	as	UNCLOS	and	so	on.	Moreover,	the	ICAO	in	its	report	concluded	 that	 "	 its	 presence	 and	 activities	 of	 naval	 forces	 in	 the	 Persian	 Gulf	 area	 have	caused	 numerous	 problems	 to	 international	 civil	 aviation".	 (ICAO,	 1988)	 Several	 violations	and	illegal	actions	have	been	committed	by	the	United	States	in	different	areas	of	the	world	in	particular	in	the	Persian	Gulf,	some	of	these	aggressions	include:	On	21-22	September,	1987,	U.S.	forces	attacked	an	Iranian	landing	craft,	namely	the	Iran	Ajr.12		On	 8	October,	 1987,	 U.S.	 helicopters	 attacked	 and	 sank	 three	 Iranian	 patrol	 boats	 near	Farsi	Island.	On	19	October,	1987,	attacked	Rashadat	Platform,	a	having	weapons	platform	with	radar	equipment	and	devices	for	communication.		On	19	October,	1987,	it	launched	an	attack	on	the	Reshadat	platforms	(Reshadat	was	first	attacked	in	October	1986).		The	 latter	 half	 of	 1987	 a	 number	 of	 incidents	 in	 which	 U.S.	 forces	 carried	 out	 attacks	against	Iranian	vessels.	On	 18	 April,	 1988	 attacks	 on	 the	 Salman	 and	Nasr	 oil	 platforms,	which	 resulted	 in	 the	destruction	of	those	platforms.	On	 18	 April,	 1988	 attack,	 the	 U.S.	 ships	 approached	 an	 Iranian	 Kaman	 patrol	 boat,	 the	Joshan.	They	fired	6	missiles	at	the	Joshan,	scoring	direct	hits	with	5	of	them,	and	then	sank	the	ship	with	gunfire.13	On	21	 June,	 2004,14	 3	British	 vessels	 including	 the	 six	marines	 and	 two	 sailors	 entered	illegally	into	Iran's	territorial	waters.	(NBCNEWS,	2004)	On	23	March,	2007,	Iranian	naval	vessels	seized	15	British15	sailors.	(Reuters,	2007)	On	5	December,	 2012,	US	pilotless	 Scan	Eagle16	 violated	 Iran	 airspace	 over	 the	Persian	Gulf	waters	after	taking	off	from	warship.	(Aljazeera,	2012)	On	 13	 January,	 2016,	 violating	 Iran’s	 waters	 by	 American	 boat	 in	 the	 Persian	 Gulf,	 10	armed	American	marines17were	detained	close	to	Farsi	island.	(Guardian,	2016)	While	 Iranian	 military	 units	 are	 attempting	 to	 protect	 their	 maritime	 security	 in	 the	Hormuz	Strait	and	 the	Persian	Gulf,	 the	U.S.	Naval	Vessels	are	seeking	 to	 interdict	maritime	security.	It	is	very	clear	that	the	coastal	state	is	responsible	for	securing	the	territorial	sea	and	Strait,	not	foreign	ships	as	for	mentioned	cases,	not	only	USA's	fleet	passage	is	not	innocent	in	the	Persian	Gulf,	but	their	presence	is	hazardous.	Such	a	grievous	events	and	egregious	crimes	are	considered	as	the	full-scale	violation	of	the	most	fundamental	principles	of	 international	law	 and	 at	 the	 same	 time	 the	 law	 and	 regulations	 of	 UNCLOS.	 As	 a	 result,	 the	 USA	 or	 any	external	 state	 cannot	 justify	 their	 presence	 for	 the	 purpose	 of	 providing	 their	 interests	 or	freedom	of	navigation.	Since	collective	interests	of	states	in	the	oceans	associated	with	to	safe	sea	lanes,	maritime	security	should	be	provided	for	the	wide	surface	of	sea	lanes,	in	particular	for	MSR.		
																																								 																				12 The	Iran	Ajr	was	a	commercial	vessel	on	charter	to	the	Iranian	navy.	13 11	people	were	killed	and	33	injured.	14	8	British	sailors	and	marines	were	arrested	after	they	entered	1,000	meters	into	Iranian	water.	They	were	released	on	25	June,	2004.			15 15	Royal	Navy	sailors	and	7	Royal	Marines	were	0.5	km	inside	Iranian	waters.	They	were	released	after	12	days,	on	5	April,	2007.	16	The	Scan	Eagle	Unmanned	Aerial	Vehicle	entered	Iranian	air	space	and	was	conducting	a	reconnaissance	flight	over	the	Persian	Gulf	when	it	was	captured.	17 Two	American	boats	were	2km	inside	Iranian	waters	when	they	were	detained,	Iran	returned	the	crew	to	a	US	Navy	vessel	in	international	waters	on	13	January	2016.	
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(b)	The	Doctrine	of	No	Sheriff			The	rise	of	colonialism	in	the	Southeast	Asia(Stefan	Eklof,	2006)	and	raid	of	many	of	the	workless	 Anglo-American	 privateers	 the	 Indian	 Ocean	 in	 the	 17th	 century(Kraska,	 2011)	caused	the		increase	of	piracy	in	the	area.	Besides,	the	Hormuz	area	had	been	dominated	for	more	 than	 a	 century	 by	 the	 Portuguese.	 They	 were	 expelled	 by	 Persians	 in	 1622.	 (Talbot,	1928)	 In	 recent	 decades,	 the	United	 States	 have	 also	 tried	 to	 control	 this	 strategic	 Strait	 of	Hormuz.	As	Admiral	Alfred	Thayer	Mahan	pointed	out	 in	his	 famous	work	“The	Influence	of	Sea	Power	Upon	History:	1660-1783”,	the	controlling	these	maritime	choke	points	is	a	matter	of	extreme	strategic	sensitivity	to	states.	(Delahunty,	2015;	Mahan,	1987)	Sovereignty	as	the	core	 of	 the	 international	 state	 system	 has	 been	 recognized	 as	 the	 right	 to	 territorial.	 (De	Nevers,	2015)	Inviolability	and	to	non-interference	in	their	 interior	affairs	by	another	states	or	actors	for	centuries.	The	U.S.	being	in	the	Persian	Gulf	and	The	South	China	Sea	illustrates	they	intend	to	penetrate	both	of	vital	region.	 In	spite	of	the	risks	and	threats	 in	the	Strait	of	Malacca,	it	should	not	be	used	as	an	excuse	to	jeopardize	the	sovereignty	of	the	regional	state,	while	 the	 states	of	 the	 region	are	able	 to	provide	 sustainable	 security	 in	 the	Malacca	Strait.	Hence,	the	first	objective	of	"Doctrine	of	No	Sheriff"	is	to	decline	impact	of	maritime	insecurity	regarding	MSR.	It	should	be	accomplished	step	by	step	thorough	the	cooperation	of	regional	states.	From	Geoffrey	Blainey	(1973)	and	Robert	Gilpin's	point	of	view,	(Gilpin,	1981)	a	peaceful	and	 stable	 international	 system	 relies	 on	 being	 a	 predominant	 state	 in	 the	 international	system	 while	 the	 majority	 of	 the	 world	 countries	 has	 shown	 their	 willpower	 aimed	 at	combating	superiority	thoughts.	 Instead,	establishing	peaceful	relations	and	life	with	mutual	respectful	 in	 accordance	 with	 international	 law.	 Entering	 exotic	 species	 within	 the	 aquatic	ecosystem	gives	rise	to	disturbance.	Similarly,	the	non-innocent	presence	of	the	external	state	in	 the	 given	 area	 results	 in	 threats	 and	 even	 risks.	 Unipolarity	 theory	 has	 not	 any	 basis	 in	international	 law	 and	 custom.	 Nevertheless,	 this	 theory	 has	 been	 included	 in	 the	 U.S.	 Neo-Intervention	and	neocolonialism	Policies.	Such	arguments	will	 constitute	new	politics	of	 the	U.S.	unipolarity	(Brooks,	Ikenberry,	&	Wohlforth,	2013)	while	the	unipolarity	encourages	and	justifies	the	reason	for	an	external	state	presence	in	each	region.	The	only	achievement	of	the	unipolarity	doctrine	is	the	development	of	insecurity.		It	is	essential	to	improve	the	security	of	MSR	due	to	the	strategic	and	geopolitics	situation	of	every	three	straits.	For	this	purpose,	the	security	concerns	of	any	region	should	be	settled	by	states	of	the	same	region,	not	by	external	states.	It	is	clear	not	only	U.S.	Naval	is	not	able	to	establish	 the	 secure	 corridor	 for	 navigation	 all	 around	 the	world,	 but	 none	of	 the	maritime	power	is	not	able	to	do	that.	Hence,	the	world	needs	a	new	order	to	rely	on	a	regional	security	network.	In	this	regard,	we	can	introduce	a	new	doctrine	namely	"Doctrine	of	No	Sheriff".	This	is	 the	 new	 framework	 and	 understanding	with	 respect	 to	 having	 the	 secure	 sea	 lanes.	 The	"Doctrine	of	No	Sheriff"	will	not	only	be	able	to	support	maritime	security	issues,	but	it	will	be	able	to	affect	economic	issues	of	states	that	follow	this	doctrine.	In	this	regard,	I	believe	that	the	new	doctrine	 is	essential	 to	 the	 interests	of	all	nations,	 coastal	and	 landlocked,	 rich	and	poor.	No	state	can	save	other	states	from	any	conflict	and	rivalry,	protect	them	from	pollution,	and	perform	other	actions	for	the	benefit	of	all.	This	would	be	an	essential	achievement	in	the	21st	Century	in	line	of	Maritime	Silk	Road.	It	is	equally	important	to	decline	and	eliminate	the	existence	of	elements	of	the	threats	and	risks	in	the	seas	as	a	way	of	trade	and	transporting,	and	as	a	source	of	products.	That	is	why,	all	states,	especially	Asian	states,	should	cooperate	with	each	other	in	an	effort	to	obtain	a	new	order	in	Asia.	
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Politics	 of	 unipolarity	 cannot	 provide	 public	 goods	 in	 any	 region	 as	 circumstantial	evidence	 have	 contrary	 demonstrated	 it,	 for	 example,	 in	 Iraq	 and	 Afghanistan	 continuing	presence	of	the	U.S.	military	forces	have	caused	they	stick	in	a	vortex.	Therefore,	it	is	entirely	impossible	that	an	external	state	can	provide	the	security	of	and	public	goods	in	other	regions.	It	is	essential	to	note	that	political	leaders	have	declared	own	benefits	in	each	region,	pledge	to	 pursue	 their	 interests	 finding	 and	 implementing	 specific	 leverages.	 The	 leverages	 of	 an	external	 state	 should	not	 obviously	 be	military	 in	practice,	 even	 if	 those	 states	declare	 that	interests	 are	 dealing	 with	 security.	 For	 instance,	 the	 United	 States	 have	 economically	subsidized	 in	 the	 Middle	 East	 with	 the	 help	 to	 Arab	 countries	 making	 peace	 with	 Israel.	(Rovner	&	Talmadge,	2014)	Not	only	the	U.S.	subsidization	has	not	caused	peace,	but	crimes	against	 the	 human	 and	 creation	 of	 ISIS	 in	 the	 middle	 east,	 in	 addition,	 leverage	 such	 as	currency	war	operations	and	proxy	war	have	increased	the	insecurity	in	the	East	and	West	of	Asia.		Joshua	 Rovner	 and	 Caitlin	 Talmadge	 (2014)	 argue	 that	 depending	 on	 a	 political	commitment	where	 it	was	declared	by	Hegemon	 to	 a	 given	 region,	 local	 force	postures	 can	take	 three	 basic	 presences,	 including	 "light	 presence",	 "heavy	 presence"	 and	 "hegemonic	presence"	they	also	maintain	these	local	forces	support	intelligence	gathering	efforts.	As	they	base	their	argument	for	political	commitment	where	the	hegemon	has	declared.	However,	the	first	 question	 would	 be	 if	 this	 presence	 is	 legal	 under	 the	 international	 law.	 The	 second	question	 can	 be	 asked	 regarding	 who	 has	 granted	 them	 the	 legal	 permission	 to	 their	continued	 presence,	 not	 for	 operational	 and	 symbolic	 purposes.	 The	 third	 question	 can	 be	whether	or	not	their	presence	has	guaranteed	any	security	in	the	Persian	Gulf	or	other	areas.	UNCLOS	has	recognized	freedom	of	navigation	in	the	EEZ	and	the	high	sea	for	all	foreign	ships	(UNCLOS,	 Articles	 58	 and	 87),	 they	 can	 pass	 through	 the	 territorial	 sea	 provided	 that	 the	“passage	 shall	 be	 continuous	 and	 expeditious”.	 (UNCLOS,	 Article	 18)	 Moreover,	 this	convention	 requires	 all	 states	 to	 obey	 the	 laws	 and	 regulations	 of	 coastal	 states.	 (UNCLOS,	Article	21)	However,	the	states	cannot	make	their	military	presence	as	an	excuse	in	vital	areas	such	 as	 the	 Persian	 Gulf	 and	 SCS.	 Therefore,	 all	 the	 threats	 or	 using	 force	 against	 the	sovereignty	political	independence	or	territorial	integrity	of	the	coastal	State	is	considered	as	insecurity	element.	The	second	goal,	pursued	by	the	"Doctrine	of	No	Sheriff",	is	to	improve	regional	security	and	the	establishment	sustainable	security	in	line	with	the	interests	of	the	states.	This	issue	is	extremely	 vital	 for	 geographical	 and	 political	 reasons	 to	 SCS	 and	 the	 Persian	 Gulf.	 What	matters	is	the	fact	that	the	presence	in	all	 forms	by	external	states	gives	the	rise	to	increase	regional	tensions.	In	May	2015,	the	Chinese	Ministry	of	National	Defense	informed	that	"In	the	foreseeable	 future,	 a	 world	 war	 is	 unlikely.	 There	 are,	 however,	 new	 threats	 from	hegemonism,	 power	 politics	 and	 neo-interventionism.	 International	 competition	 for	 the	redistribution	of	power,	rights,	and	interests	is	tending	to	intensify".	(China,	2017)	To	sum	it	up,	the	presence	of	external	states	like	U.S.	and	the	UK	forces	have	been	known	as	an	indirect	element	of	navigation	security	and	regional	security.	It	is	noticeable	to	mention	that,	when	the	U.S.	 declared	 the	war	 in	 1986,	 they	 aimed	 to	 control	 16	main	maritime	 lanes	 including	 the	Malacca	and	Hormuz	Straits.	(Wang,	2015)	For	 the	 above	 reasons,	 a	 great	 concentration	 of	 the	 U.S.	military	 fleet	 in	 such	 a	 special	territory	 as	 SCS	 and	 the	 Persian	 Gulf	 is	 unacceptable	 from	 the	 perspective	 of	 sustainable	security.	Hence	this	in	effect	means	that	the	USA	is	seeking	to	unbalance	stability	and	increase	tensions	 in	 SCS	 and	 the	Malacca	 Strait	 and	 the	 Strait	 of	 Hormuz	 to	 fixate	 their	 presence	 in	these	 areas.	 The	 Strait	 of	 Malacca,	 for	 geographical	 and	 multi-State	 reasons,	 possesses	different	situation	to	the	Strait	of	Hormuz,	but	both	of	straits	have	common	features	as	both	
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are	 the	most	 sensitive	 superhighways	 for	 transferring	 energy	 and	 goods	 in	 the	world.	 The	only	entry	to	the	Persian	Gulf	is	through	the	Strait	of	Hormuz,	accordingly	almost	all	maritime	traffic	must	 traverse	 through	 Iran	 territorial	waters,	and	exit	 through	Oman	waters.	 Iranian	Revolutionary	Guard	Corps	Navy	(IRGCN)	monitors	and	controls	 the	Strait	of	Hormuz	along	with	 the	 Sultanate	of	Oman	via	 the	Omani	 enclave	of	Musandam.	Hence,	 they	have	 security	responsibility	 in	 the	Strait	 of	Hormuz.	The	Persian	Gulf	 as	 the	heart	of	 the	Middle	East	 and	arena	 for	geopolitical	rivalries	has	 testified	different	phases	of	 the	presence	of	Great	Britain	and	the	USA	since	1945.	(Rovner	&	Talmadge,	2014)	At	present	Iran	is	a	security	provider	in	the	Persian	Gulf	and	Strait	of	Hormuz	as	well	as	a	part	of	the	Indian	Ocean,	it	is	known	as	the	first	power	in	the	Middle	East.	Besides,	in	the	future,	it	will	be	known	as	an	economic	hub.	In	this	connection,	 it	 is	 important	to	mention	that,	although	the	UNCLOS	has	recognized	the	"freedom	of	navigation"	for	passage	through	international	straits,	no	state	has	the	right	to	endanger	national	security	or	maritime	security	of the	coastal	state.	In	reality,	the	continued	presence	 of	 external	 state	 has	 not	 been	 evaluated	 just	 as	 innocent	 presence,	 but	 it	 is	 an	effective	 indirect	 element	 of	maritime	 security,	 besides,	 it	 is	 in	 the	 interests	 of	 neither	 the	national	coastal	state	nor	maritime	security	of	any	region.	It	should	also	be	noted	that	a	few	decades	ago	using	anachronistic	ways	like	"showing	the	flag"	and	"gunboat	diplomacy"	were	the	 illustrations	of	 the	political	power	and	marine	power	using	 force	 to	 conserve	or	 extend	vital	interests	(Reisman,	1980)	although	it	would	be	imprudent.	Overall,	given	today's	world	diplomatic	relations,	these	practices	would	be	imprudent.	It	is	time	to	refer	to	a	new	doctrine	for	the	establishment	of	maritime	security	in	the	sea	lanes,	in	particular	in	MSR.	A	"Doctrine	of	No	 Sheriff"	 with	 a	 view	 to	 the	 non-intervention	 principle,	 emphasizing	 UN	 Charter	 with	respect	to	the	establishment	of	the	peace	and	international	security	will	be	able	to	open	a	new	window	to	rise	sustainable	security	with	peace	in	MSR.	Security	will	not	be	realized	unless	the	new	concept	of	security	is	formed	through	the	redefinition	of	the	idea	of	maritime	security	so	that	their	own	Asian	states	perform	as	maritime	security	provider	for	MSR.			In	light	of	the	above	discussion,	the	continued	and	perilous	presence	of	an	external	state	in	a	given	area,	on	the	one	hand,	and	the	militarization	by	external	state	or	military	alliances,	on	 the	other	hand,	 can	be	 considered	 indirect	 elements	against	maritime	security.	To	put	 it	mildly,	 it	 is	 interesting	to	mention	that	there	are	two	similar	traditional	doctrines	in	Iranian	and	Chinese	cultures.	Confucius	says:	"In	heaven,	there	are	no	two	Suns;	there	can	be	no	two	kings	 on	 earth".	 (Kong	 Zi,	 2013)	 The	 author	 does	 not	 believe	 the	 idea	 of	 a	 "Unified	world"	under	 the	 political	 authority	 of	 a	 single	 supreme	 sovereign.	 "Unified	 world"	 would	 be	acceptable	 in	 the	 framework	of	mutual	respect,	 the	peace	 language,	 free	of	 force	and	threat,	the	maintenance	of	the	territorial	integrity	of	all	of	the	small	and	big	states.	For	this	purpose,	a	"Doctrine	of	No	Sheriff"	is	based	on	the	non-single	supreme	sovereign.	Hence,	no	country	can	tolerate	the	hazardous	presence	of	the	external	state.	In	other	words,	such	trends	would	have	evaluated	as	neocolonialism	and	aggressive	approaches.	Besides,	the	international	community	will	 not	 accept	 such	 approaches.	 There	 is	 no	 doubt	 that	 cooperation	 with	 regards	 to	 the	sharing	of	the	security	burden	for	the	rising	of	maritime	security	should	be	limited	to	coastal	states	 in	 particular	 on	 the	MSR	ways.	 Despite	 disputes	 over	 ownership	 of	 some	 islands	 or	other	marine	features	 in	the	SCS,	 littoral	states	 in	the	SCS	and	the	Malacca	Strait	as	the	first	area,	coastal	states	 in	the	Indian	Ocean	as	the	second	area	and	the	Strait	of	Hormuz	and	the	Persian	Gulf	as	 the	 third	area,	 the	security	burden	should	undertake	 in	 three	areas	 through	establishment	 of	 the	 secure	 corridor.	 In	 other	words,	 these	 countries	 should	 share	 security	burden	with	the	same	region	countries	in	each	area.	In	conclusion,	the	world	does	not	need	a	"Sheriff".				
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Conclusion		 The	 two	 super	 strategic	 Straits	 of	Malacca	 and	 Hormuz	 are	 the	 important	 gates	 of	 the	Maritime	Silk	Road,	where	the	Achilles	heel	of	trade	and	energy	distribution	is	spinning	over	the	sustainable	peace	and	security	of	the	two	straits.	The	Maritime	Silk	Road,	actually,	starts	from	China,	however,	politically	speaking,	it	starts	from	the	Northern	Korea	since	MSR	is	not	only	 a	 trade	and	 culture	 road	but	 it	will	 be	 the	 future	 roadmap	of	Asia	 and	 the	world.	This	article	discusses	a	different	approach	to	maritime	security	and	proposes	a	new	classification	with	respect	 to	maritime	security,	 in	particular,	 this	 categorization	applies	 to	 three	areas	 in	the	 Maritime	 Silk	 Road.	 The	 concept	 of	 maritime	 security	 is	 related	 to	 several	 factors	 and	depends	on	who	uses	the	term	or	in	what	context	it	is	used.	Further,	"maritime	security"	and	"maritime	 safety"	 depend	on	human	unlawful	 acts	 and	 environmental	 conditions	 or	 human	errors	respectively.	Generally	speaking,	it	may	be	concluded	that	maritime	security	would	be	any	act	whether	direct	or	indirect,	which	would	endanger	or	threaten	the	security	of	a	coastal	state,	the	sea	lanes,	the	marine	environment,	vessels,	property	or	persons.	This	 article	 is	 focused	 on	 the	 recognition	 of	 real	 elements	 of	 insecurity	 in	 MSR,	 in	particular,	in	the	Persian	Gulf	and	SCS	and	the	two	most	important	lifelines,	namely,	the	Strait	of	 Hormuz	 and	 the	 Malacca	 Strait.	 For	 this	 purpose,	 this	 study	 attempts	 to	 express	 a	 new	classification	 of	 maritime	 security.	 This	 new	 classification	 is	 used	 to	 distinguish	 between	direct	 and	 indirect	 elements	 involved	 in	 maritime	 security.	 Despite	 the	 fact	 that	 several	violations	of	international	law	and	painful	events	occurred	due	to	the	presence	of	an	external	state,	 the	continued	and	perilous	presence	of	an	external	 state	as	an	 insecurity	element	has	not	 been	 taken	 into	 consideration	 by	 the	 scholars.	 Indirect	 insecurities,	 such	 as	 repeated	international	law	violations	by	the	U.S.	Navy	in	the	SCS	and	the	Persian	Gulf	lead	to	tensions	and	incitement	among	littoral	states.	As	the	existence	of	an	exotic	species	in	an	ecosystem	can	have	 a	 serious	 risk	 and	 destruction,	 the	 dangerous	 and	 continued	 presence	 of	 an	 external	state	 in	a	given	 region	will	 give	 rise	 to	negative	and	dangerous	 consequences.	Non-regional	states	 intervention	 to	 eliminate	 armed	 robbery	 and	piracy	 in	 the	 Strait	 of	Malacca	 or	 other	risky	 places	 will	 become	 the	 pretext	 to	 attack	 the	 sovereignty	 of	 smaller,	 comparatively	weaker,	states.	It	can	obviously	increase	international	tension	at	the	particular	area.	The	Bush’s	administration	launched	three	major	Initiatives,	it	is	obvious	those	Initiatives	have	 been	 designated	 for	 pretext	 of	 patrolling	 indeed,	 it	 is	 for	 the	 purpose	 of	 all-round	presence	throughout	the	world.	It	should	be	mentioned;	the	doctrine	of	presence	is	not	newly	established	 by	 the	 Trump’s	 administration.	 In	 fact,	 the	 United	 States	 have	 put	 it	 as	 the	 top	priority	 to	 preserve	 its	 presence	 at	 the	 seas	 throughout	 their	 nation’s	 history.	 They	institutionalized	 the	 presence	 policy	 more	 than	 four	 decades	 ago	 in	 the	 American	 macro	politics.	Thus,	this	will	continue	if	governments	change.	The	doctrine	of	presence	formally	was	established	 and	 developed	 under	 FON	 Program	 by	 presidents	 Jimmy	 Carter	 and	 Ronald	Reagan.	The	 Maritime	 Security	 Framework	 suggests	 that	 insecurity	 in	 maritime	 zones	 are	constructed	by	a	series	of	 threats	or	risks	 in	 two	major	groups.	 In	 this	 framework,	an	 issue,	such	as	armed	robbery	or	piracy,	and	the	continued	presence	of	warships,	is	identified	as	an	existing	risk	and	threat	 to	the	specific	referent	object	 for	 instance	 international	 trade	or	the	coastal	state’s	national	security.	Basically,	SCS	and	the	Malacca	Strait	will	not	acquire	security	unless	 the	 idea	 of	maritime	 security	 is	 redefined	 so	 that	 their	 own	Asian	 states	 perform	as	maritime	 security	 providers	 for	 MSR.	 Forasmuch	 as,	 USA's	 violation	 and	 destabilizing	activities	in	the	Persian	Gulf	and	the	South	China	Sea,	its	presence	and	passage	are	considered 
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as	non-innocent	 activities,	 as	 these	 are	prejudicial	 to	 the	 security,	 peace,	 and	 good order	 of	coastal states.	Thus,	in	this	research	for	the	first	time,	a	new	classification	of	maritime	security	plus	a	new	"Doctrine	of	No	Sheriff"	has	been	proposed	for	giving	a	new	road	map	of	maritime	security.	 Finally,	 Asian	 states	 by	 the	 following	 of	 "Doctrine	 of	 No	 Sheriff"	 will	 be	 able	 to	prevent	hegemony	in	every	region.	This	doctrine	is	applicable	in	the	relations	between	coastal	States	and	other	states	in	MSR	which	have	vital	interests.	Some	important	countries,	such	as	China,	Malaysia,	Indonesia,	India,	Pakistan,	Iran,	and	Oman,	Japan	and	other	user	countries	of	the	Malacca	Strait	and	the	Persian	Gulf	are	among	these	states.	MSR	 is	 not	 only	 a	 simple	 road,	 it	 is	 a	 new	approach	 for	 safe	 and	 secure	 seas,	maritime	interests	with	a	successful	maritime	and	cultural	heritage	all	over	the	world.	All	states	depend	on	 the	 sea	 for	 their	 prosperity.	 The	 stable	 global	 market,	 access	 to	 energy,	 manufactured	goods,	and	the	raw	materials	are	reliant	on	sustainable	security	throughout	the	sea	lanes.	The	concepts	of	"Doctrine	of	No	Sheriff"	proposed	connecting	and	improving	the	various	aspects	of	the	security	progress	of	the	oceans	and	establishing	sustainable	security	strategies	for	MSR.	The	most	 important	 objective	 of	 "Doctrine	 of	No	 Sheriff"	 seek	 to	 decline	 impact	 of	 indirect	elements,	 improving	security	region	by	region	and	the	establishment	of	sustainable	security	at	 the	 seas	 in	 line	 with	 the	 interests	 of	 the	 states.	 The	 existence	 of	 an	 efficient	 system	 of	security	 in	 MSR	 depends	 mostly	 on	 the	 political	 views	 of	 Asian	 nations.	 The	 lack	 of	 trust	among	some	of	the	countries	in	the	Southeastern	Asia	is	one	of	the	determinant	elements.	In	brief,	piracy	and	armed	robbery	are	recognized	as	the	most	remarkable	of	direct	elements	of	insecurity	in	the	ocean,	however,	the	continued	and	precarious	presence	of	external	state	has	not	been	regarded	from	the	perspective	of	international	law	or	ocean	management	or	regional	studies.	 This	 factor	 brings	 about	 enormous	 risk	 and	 threats,	 undermining	 regional	 security	and	increasing	the	risks	of	a	military	confrontation	in	both	short	and	long- term.	Hence,	under	the	 "Doctrine	of	No	Sheriff"	Asian	 states	 and	other	 states	will	 have	an	opportunity	 to	 enjoy	sustainable	security	in	MSR.	Coastal	states	support	the	balance	of	rights	and	duties	reflected	in	their	international	law	and	regulations	together	with	their	interests.	Foreign	vessels	enjoy	the	right	of	 transit	and	peaceful	 traffic,	as	 long	as	their	passage	 is	safe	and	secure.	Maritime	Security	Framework	suggests	 that	 insecurity	 in	maritime	zones	 is	constructed	by	a	series	of	threats	or	risks	in	two	major	groups.	The	framework	has	some	issues,	such	as	armed	robbery	or	 piracy,	 and	 the	 continued	 presence	 of	 warships	 is	 identified	 to	 be	 respectively	 an	existential	risk	and	threat	to	some	specific	referent	objects,	for	example,	international	trade	or	the	national	security	of	the	coastal	state.		
Acknowledgements		 I	 must	 express	 my	 very	 profound	 gratitude	 to	 the	 Great	 and	 Merciful	 Creator	 for	 his	boundless	 Generosity	 and	 Kindness.	 The	 author	 extends	 special	 thanks	 to	 his	 mother	 and	family	 for	providing	him	with	unfailing	support	and	continuous	encouragement.	The	author	wishes	 to	 thank	 his	 Supervisor	 Professor	 FU.	 Finally,	 I	 am	 grateful	 to	 all	 my	 teachers	throughout	my	life	as	well	as	Miss	Vasylieva	for	great	edition	of	the	article.	I	hope	this	study	will	provide	an	introduction	to	widespread	developments	in	Asia	and	the	world.		
References		AL-MAYADEEN.	2018.	In	a	document	obtained	by	the	fields:	This	is	how	America	develops	and	
spreads	 deadly	 viruses	 in	 the	 world.	 Retrieved	 February	 21,	 2020,	 from	
Zohourian	I	A	New	Maritime	Security	Architecture	for	the	21st	Century	Maritime	Silk	Road	
Revista	de	Estudos	Constitucionais,	Hermenêutica	e	Teoria	do	Direito	(RECHTD),	12(2):239-262	259	
http://m.almayadeen.net/news/politics/855951/%2525D8%2525A7%2525D9%252584%2525D9%252585%2525D9%25258A%2525D8%2525A7%2525D8%2525AF%2525D9%25258A%2525D9%252586-%2525D8%2525AA%2525D9%252583%2525D8%2525B4%2525D9%252581-%2525D8%2525B9%2525D9%252586-%2525D9%252588%2525D8%2525AB%2525D9%25258A%2525D9%252582%2525D8%2525A9-%2525D8%2525AD%2525D9%25	ALJAZEERA.	2012.	Iran	claims	capture	of	US	drone.	News.	Al	Jazeera.	Retrieved	November	10,	2017,	from	http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2012/12/2012124758228897.html	ALJAZEERA.	2017.	China	protests	US	ship	near	South	China	Sea	island.	China	News.	Al	Jazeera.	Retrieved	 November	 8,	 2017,	 from	 http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/08/china-protests-ship-south-china-sea-island-170811034407390.html	ALWAGHT.	2018.	Biological	Experiments	on	“Flies	and	Mosquitoes”:	A	New	American	Strategy	
to	 Kill	 Humans.	 Retrieved	 February	 21,	 2020,	 from	http://alwaght.com/ar/News/124383/ براجتلا- ةیجولویبلا- ىلع- بابذلا- ؛ضوعبلاو- سا 	ATTARD,	 F.	 2014.	 IMO’s	 Contribution	 to	 International	 Law	 Regulating	 Maritime	 Security.	
Journal	 of	 Maritime	 Law	 &	 Commerce,	 45(4):479–565.	 https://doi.org/10.3868/s050-004-015-0003-8	BLAINEY,	 G.	 1973.	 The	 Causes	 of	War.	 London,	 Macmillan.	 https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1536-7150.1946.tb01826.x	BLANCHARD,	J.	M.	F.,;	FLINT,	C.	2017.	The	geopolitics	of	China’s	maritime	silk	road	initiative.	
Geopolitics,	22(2):223–245.	https://doi.org/10.1080/14650045.2017.1291503	BROOKS,	S.	G.;	IKENBERRY,	G.	J.;	WOHLFORTH,	W.	C.	2013.	Don’t	Come	Home,	America:	The	Case	 against	 Retrenchment.	 International	 Security,	 37(3):7–51.	https://doi.org/10.1162/ISEC_a_00107	BUEGER,	 C.	 2015.	 What	 is	 maritime	 security?	 Marine	 Policy,	 53:159–164.	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.marpol.2014.12.005	CHATTERJEE,	A.	2014.	Non-traditional	Maritime	Security	Threats	in	the	Indian	Ocean	Region.	
Maritime	 Affairs:	 Journal	 of	 the	 National	 Maritime	 Foundation	 of	 India,	 10(2):77–95.	https://doi.org/10.1080/09733159.2014.972669	CHINA,	 T.	 S.	 C.	 I.	 O.	 of	 the	 P.	 R.	 of.	 (2017).	Document:	 China’s	Military	 Strategy.	USNI	News.	Retrieved	 November	 10,	 2017,	 from	 https://news.usni.org/2015/05/26/document-chinas-military-strategy	CHUNG,	C.	P.	2017.	What	are	the	strategic	and	economic	implications	for	South	Asia	of	China’s	Maritime	 Silk	 Road	 initiative?	 Pacific	 Review,	 (December),	 1–18.	https://doi.org/10.1080/09512748.2017.1375000	DARYAEE,	T.	2003.	The	Persian	Gulf	trade	in	late	Antiquity.	Journal	of	World	History,	14(1):1–16.	https://doi.org/10.2307/20079006	DE	NEVERS,	R.	2015.	Sovereignty	at	sea:	States	and	security	in	the	maritime	domain.	Security	
Studies,	24(4):597-630.	https://doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2015.1103132	DELAHUNTY,	 R.	 J.	 2015.	 Towards	 a	 Concert	 of	 Asia?	 A	 Proposed	 International	 Security	Regime.	University	of	Pennsylvania	Asian	Law	Review,	11:1-79.	EKLOF,	S.	2006.	Pirates	in	paradise:	A	modern	history	of	Southeast	Asia’s	maritime	marauders.	Nordic	Institute	of	Asian	Studies.	FELLMETH,	 A.	 X.;	 Horwitz,	 M.	 2009.	 Guide	 to	 Latin	 in	 International	 Law.	 Oxford,	 Oxford	University	Press.	GANESAN,	N.	2008.	Regional	Security:	Singapore	perspective.	 In:	S.	Takashi	 (Ed.),	Across	 the	
Causeway:	A	Multi-dimensional	 Study	of	Malaysia-Singapore	Relations.	 Singapore,	 Institute	of	
Zohourian	I	A	New	Maritime	Security	Architecture	for	the	21st	Century	Maritime	Silk	Road	
Revista	de	Estudos	Constitucionais,	Hermenêutica	e	Teoria	do	Direito	(RECHTD),	12(2):239-262	 260	
Southeast	Asian	Studies,	pp.	175–186.	GERTZ,	 B.	 2020.	Coronavirus	 link	 to	 China	 biowarfare	 program	possible.	Retrieved	 February	23,	 2020,	 from	https://m.washingtontimes.com/news/2020/jan/26/coronavirus-link-china-biowarfare-program-possible/	GILPIN,	R.	1981.	War	and	Change	 in	World	Politics.	 Cambridge,	Cambridge	University	Press.	https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511664267	GRØNNING,	B.	E.	M.	2017.	Japan’s	security	cooperation	with	the	Philippines	and	Vietnam.	The	
Pacific	Review,	1–20.	https://doi.org/10.1080/09512748.2017.1397730	GUARDIAN.	 2016.	 Iran	 demands	 apology	 after	 detaining	US	 navy	 boat	 crews	 for	 “violating”	Gulf	 waters.	 The	 Guardian,	 January	 12,	 2016,	 from	https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jan/12/iran-detains-two-us-navy-ships-persian-gulf	HAWKES,	K.	G.	1989.	Maritime	Security.	Centreville,	Cornell	Maritime	Press.	ICAO.	 1948.	 Convention	 on	 International	 Civil	 Aviation.	 Retrieved	 from	http://www.icao.int/publications/Documents/7300_9ed.pdf	ICAO.	1971.	Convention	for	the	Suppression	of	Unlawful	Acts	Against	the	Safety	of	Civil	Aviation	(	Montreal	Convention	).	ICAO.	1988.	Report	of	the	ICAO	Fact-Finding	Investigation.	IMO.	2001.	Resolution	A.922(22).	IMO.	2009.	Resolution	A.1025(26).	IMO.	2019.	Global	Integrated	Shipping	Information	System.	Retrieved	September	4,	2019,	from	https://gisis.imo.org/Public/Default.aspx	MAK,	J.	N.	2006.	Unilateralism	and	Regionalism:	Working	Together	and	Alone	in	the	Malacca	Straits.	In:	G.	G.	Ong-Webb.	(Ed.),	Piracy,	maritime	terrorism	and	securing	the	Malacca	Straits,	Singapore,	ISEAS/IIAS,	pp.	134–162.	MAK,	 J.	N.	2011.	Maritime	Security	and	 the	ARF:	why	 the	 focus	on	 the	Dialogue	 rather	 than	action.	 In:	 J.	 H.	 and	 N.	M.	Morada	 (Ed.),	Cooperative	 Security	 in	 the	 Asia-Pacific:	 The	 ASEAN	
Regional	Forum,	London,	Routledge,	pp.	172–198.	JESUS,	H.	E.	J.	L.	2003.	Protection	of	Foreign	Ships	against	Piracy	and	Terrorism	at	Sea:	Legal	Aspects.	International	Journal	of	Marine	and	Coastal	Law,	19(1):363–400.	LI,	 K	 X.;	 CHENG,	 J.	 2006.	 Maritime	 Law	 and	 Policy	 for	 Energy	 Security	 in	 Asia	 a	 Chinese	Perspective.	 Journal	 of	 Maritime	 Law	 and	 Commerce,	 1:567–588.	https://doi.org/10.3366/ajicl.2011.0005@	KLEIN,	N.	2011.	Maritime	Security	and	the	Law	of	the	Sea	(reprint).	Oxford.	KONG	 ZI,	 (Confucius).	 2013.	 The	 Book	 of	 Rites.	 (L.	 G.	 and	 D.	 Sheng,	 Ed.).	 Createspace	Independent	Pub.	KRASKA,	J.	2011.	Contemporary	Maritime	Piracy:	International	Law,	Strategy,	and	Diplomacy	at	
Sea.	California,	Praeger.	KRASKA,	 J.	2014.	Legal	Vortex	 in	 the	Strait	of	Hormuz.	Virginia	 Journal	of	 International	Law,	
54(2):323–366.	KUPPUSWAMY,	C.	S.	2004.	Straits	of	Malacca:	Security	Implications.	South	Asia	Analysis	Group,	1033.	Retrieved	from	http://www.southasiaanalysis	LI,	Q.	2006.	Maritime	silk	road.	Beijing,	China	International	Press.	MACK,	A.	1993.	Security	Regimes	 for	 the	Oceans	The	Tragedy	of	 the	Commons,	 the	Security	Dilemma,	and	Common	Security.	In:	G.	H.	Jon	M.	Van	Dyke,	Durwood	Zaelke	(Ed.),	Freedom	for	
the	 Seas	 in	 the	 21st	 Century:	 Ocean	 Governance	 and	 Environmental	 Harmony,	 Washington,	Island	Press,	pp.	409-419.	MAHAN,	 A.	 T.	 1987.	 The	 Influence	 of	 Sea	 Power	 Upon	 History	 1660-1783.	 Mineola,	 Dover	
Zohourian	I	A	New	Maritime	Security	Architecture	for	the	21st	Century	Maritime	Silk	Road	
Revista	de	Estudos	Constitucionais,	Hermenêutica	e	Teoria	do	Direito	(RECHTD),	12(2):239-262	261	
Publications.	MEJIA,	 M.	 J.	 2003.	 Maritime	 Gerrymandering:	 Dilemmas	 in	 Defining	 Piracy,	 Terrorism	 and	other	Acts	of	Maritime	Violence.	Journal	of	International	Commercial	Law,	2(2):153–175.	MINDEF.	 2016.	 Fact	 Sheet:	 The	 Malacca	 Straits	 Patrol.	 Retrieved	 June	 2,	 2018,	 from	https://www.mindef.gov.sg/web/portal/mindef/news-and-events/latest-releases/article-detail/2016/april/2016apr21-news-releases-00134/	MO,	 J.	 2002.	 Options	 to	 Combat	 Maritime	 Piracy	 in	 Southeast	 Asia.	 Ocean	 Development	 &	
International	Law,	33(3–4):343–358.	https://doi.org/10.1080/00908320290054819	NBCNEWS.	 2004.	 8	 British	 troops	 on	 way	 out	 of	 Iran.	NBC	 News.	 Retrieved	 November	 10,	2017,	 from	 http://www.nbcnews.com/id/5261548/ns/world_news/t/british-troops-way-out-iran/	PERCY,	 S.	 2016.	 Maritime	 crime	 and	 naval	 response.	 Survival,	 58(3):155–189.	https://doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2016.1186986	PRAKASH	 Karat.	 2007.	 Subordinate	 Ally:	 The	 Nuclear	 Deal	 and	 India-US	 Strategic	 Relations.	New	Delhi,	LeftWord	Books.	RAHHAL,	 N.	 2020.	Wuhan,	 China’s	 coronavirus	 epicentre,	 has	 SARS	 and	 Ebola	 lab.	 Retrieved	February	 23,	 2020,	 from	 https://www.dailymail.co.uk/health/article-7922379/Chinas-lab-studying-SARS-Ebola-Wuhan-outbreaks-center.html	REISMAN,	 W.	 M.	 1980.	 The	 Regime	 of	 Straits	 and	 National	 Security:	 An	 Appraisal	 of	International	Lawmaking.	The	American	Journal	of	International	Law,	74(1):48–76.	REUTERS.	 2007.	 TIMELINE	 -	 British	 sailors	 captured	 by	 Iran.	Retrieved	 November	 8,	 2017,	from	 http://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-britain-iran-kidnap-chronology/timeline-british-sailors-captured-by-iran-idUKL1964179720070619	ROACH,	 J.	 A.	 2011.	 General	 Problematic	 Issues	 on	 Exercise	 of	 Jurisdiction	 over	 Modern	instances	of	Piracy.	 In:	Selected	Contemporary	 Issues	 in	 the	Law	of	 the	Sea.	 Leiden,	Martinus	Nijhoff,	pp.	1–360.	ROGERS,	R.	2010.	Ship	Rregistration:	A	Critical	Analysis.	SL,	World	Maritime	University.	ROSENBERG,	 D.;	 CHUNG,	 C.	 2008.	 Maritime	 security	 in	 the	 South	 China	 Sea:	 Coordinating	coastal	 and	 user	 state	 priorities.	 Ocean	 Development	 and	 International	 Law,	 39(1):51–68.	https://doi.org/10.1080/00908320701641602	ROVNER,	 J.;	 TALMADGE,	 C.	 2014.	 Hegemony,	 Force	 Posture,	 and	 the	 Provision	 of	 Public	Goods:	 The	 Once	 and	 Future	 Role	 of	 Outside	 Powers	 in	 Securing	 Persian	 Gulf	 Oil.	 Security	
Studies,	23(3):548–581.	https://doi.org/10.1080/15325024.2014.935224	SEIN,	 A.	 G.	 H.;	 K.	 M.	 2004.	 Jurisdiction	 over	 a	 Person	 Abducted	 from	 a	 Foreign	 Country:	Alvarez	Machain	case	Revisited.	Journal	of	Malaysian	and	Comparative	Law,	31(1):69-86.	SHAW,	 M.	 2008.	 International	 Law.	 Vasa	 (Sixth).	 Cambridge,	 Cambridge	 University	 Press.	https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781107415324.004	STEINMANN,	L.	K.	2012.	Shah	Abbas	and	the	Royal	Silk	Trade.	Taylor	&	Francis,	14(1):68–74.	WILSKE,	 S.;	 SCHILLER,	 T.	 1988.	 Jurisdiction	 Over	 Persons	 Abducted	 in	 Violation	 of	International	Law	in	the	Aftermath	of	United	States	v	Alvarez.	The	University	of	Chicago	Law	
School	Roundtable,	5(1):205-242.	STEVENSON,	A.	2020.	Senator	Tom	Cotton	Repeats	Fringe	Theory	of	Coronavirus	Origins.	NY	
Times,	 February	 23,	 2020,	 from	https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/17/business/media/coronavirus-tom-cotton-china.html	STOREY,	 I.	 2008.	 Securing	 Southeast	 Asia’s	 Sea	 Lanes:	 A	 Work	 in	 Progress.	 Asia	 Policy,	
6(1):95–128.	https://doi.org/10.1353/asp.2008.0025	SUMMERS,	 T.	 2016.	 China’s	 ‘New	 Silk	 Roads’:	 sub-national	 regions	 and	 networks	 of	 global	
Zohourian	I	A	New	Maritime	Security	Architecture	for	the	21st	Century	Maritime	Silk	Road	
Revista	de	Estudos	Constitucionais,	Hermenêutica	e	Teoria	do	Direito	(RECHTD),	12(2):239-262	 262	
political	 economy.	 Third	 World	 Quarterly,	 37(9):1628–1643.	https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2016.1153415	TALBOT,	W.	A.	 1928.	The	 Persian	Gulf :	 An	Historical	 Sketch	 From	The	 Earliest	 Times	 to	 The	
Beginning	Of	The	Twentieth	Century.	Oxford,	Milford	Publisher.	TEO,	 Y.	 Y.	 2007.	 Target	 Malacca	 Straits:	 Maritime	 terrorism	 in	 Southeast	 Asia.	 Studies	 in	
Conflict	and	Terrorism,	30(6):541–561.	https://doi.org/10.1080/10576100701329568	UK	Government.	2014.	The	UK	National	Strategy	for	Maritime	Security.	London,	UKG.	UNION,	C.	of	the	E.	2014.	The	European	Union	Maritime	Security	Strategy.	Brussels.	UNITED	NATIONS.	2008.	Oceans	and	the	 law	of	 the	Sea	Report	of	 the	Secretary	 -General.	Vol.	A/63/63).	UNITED	NATIONS.	1982.	United	Nations	Convention	on	the	Law	of	the	Sea.	United	Nations.	WANG,	L.	2015.	Sea	Lanes	and	Chinese	National	Energy	Security.	Journal	of	Coastal	Research,	
73(73):572–576.	https://doi.org/10.2112/SI73-099.1	WESTCOTT,	B.;	JIANG,	S.	2020.	Chinese	diplomat	promotes	conspiracy	theory.	CNN,	March	13,	2020.	 Retrieved	 March	 16,	 2020,	 from	 https://edition.cnn.com/2020/03/13/asia/china-coronavirus-us-lijian-zhao-intl-hnk/index.html	WOOLLEY,	 C.	 R.	 2010.	 Piracy	 and	 Sovereign	 Rights :	 Addressing	 Piracy	 in	 the	 Straits	 of	Malacca	 Without	 Degrading	 the	 Sovereign	 Rights	 of	 Indonesia	 and	 Malaysia.	 Santa	 Clara	
Journal	of	International	Law,	447–472.	WU,	S.	2010.	Maritime	Security	in	the	South	China	Sea:	Regional	Implications	and	International	
Cooperation.	(K.	Zou,	Ed.).	London,	Routledge.	XINHUA.	2015.	Chronology	of	China’s	Belt	and	Road	Initiative.	Xinhuanet.	Retrieved	June	13,	2018,	from	http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2015-03/28/c_134105435.htm	ZOHOURIAN,	M.	A.	2018.	The	Real	Nature	of	Artificial	Islands,	Installation	and	Structures	from	Perspective	of	Law	of	the	Sea.	Asia-Pacific	Journal	of	Law,	Politics	and	Administration,	2(1):13–26.			
Submetido:	16/03/2020	
Aceito:	29/06/2020		
